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THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION:
THE POSSIBILITIES OF AND THE




The public and the private worlds are inseparably connected... The tyrannies and
servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other.
Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse
The constitutional entrenchment of sex equality rights in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 was a resounding political
victory for feminists in Canada, particularly in light of the failure of
American feminists to obtain an Equal Rights Amendment to the
Copyright, Judy Fudge, 1988. I would like to thank Shelley Gavigan, Harry Glasbeek and
Margaret Thornton for many helpful conversations on this topic.
Assistant Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Ac4 1982 being
schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K., 1982, c.11.) [Hereinafter cited as the Charter.]
S.15 (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does no preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those
that are disadvantaged because of race national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.
S.28 Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to
in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
American Constitution.2 Not only was the legislative override of the
equality guarantees defeated, but the feminist organizations involved
in lobbying the provincial and federal governments obtained
constitutional language which avoided most of the linguistic pitfalls
contained in the earlier Canadian Bill of Rights!
Paradoxically, the entrenchment of equality rights in the
Canadian Charter says more about the openness of the Canadian
political process to equality claims when contrasted with the United
States, than it does about the value of such rights as part of the
legal process. Whilst the struggle around the issue of sexual equality
was both a mobilizing and radicalizing process for many Canadian
feminists, the same cannot be said about the outcomes of the
implementation of that political victory. Once translated into legal
rights, the demand for substantive equality for women has become
truncated and divorced from broader political demands. This is true
despite the fact that the Charter provided a lead in time of three
years before the equality rights provisions were operative, thus giving
the courts ample opportunity to digest the appeals of academic
commentators and legal activists for the adoption of an interpretive
approach more sensitive to the claims of systemic discrimination than
the approach previously adopted by the courts.4 Because of the
slow pace of governmental action proactively to remedy legislation
2C Hosek, "Women and the Constitutional Process" in K. Banting and R. Simeon, eds,
AndNo One Cheered (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) at 280; C. MacKinnon, "Making Sex Equality
Real" in L Smith et al., eds, Righting the Balance Canada's New Equality Rights (Saskatoon:
The Human Rights Reporter, 1986). See also J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986). U.S. feminists and lawmakers have launched a new drive to
add an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution; T'ush for Equal Rights Amendment
Gets New Hope From U.S. Lawmakers" The Toronto Star (7 July 1988) K9.
3R.S.C. 1970, App. III. L.A Pal and F.L. Morton, "Bliss vAttomey General of Canada:
'From Legal Defeat to Actual Victory" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 141-160 at 157.
4See, for example, A.G. Canada v. Lavell (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 11 D.L.R. (3d)
481 (S.C.C.) and W. Tarnapolsky, 'The Canadian Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court
Decisions in Lavell and Burnshine: A Retreat from Drybones to Dicey?" (1975) Ottawa L.
R. 1.
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activists formed the Women's Legal Action and Education Fund
(LEAF) in April 1985. LEAF's objective is to assist women with
important test cases and to ensure that equality rights litigation is
undertaken in a planned, responsible and expert manner.6 However,
it appears that the combined efforts of academic exhortation and
repeated litigation have had little effect in persuading lower courts
to adopt a radical new stance to equality rights in order to alleviate
women's subordinate position in society. In fact, commentators who
initially hailed the Charter as an unqualified victory are now having
second thoughts regarding its efficacy in the struggle to end the
oppression of historically disadvantaged groups, women included.7
Thus, once again Canadian feminists are confronted with the gulf
between formal, and often merely symbolic, legal equality and
substantive, material inequality for women.
Rather than examining the efficacy of constitutionally
entrenched rights in general for furthering the struggle for women's
substantive equality, what I shall do is concentrate on the
public/private distinction in an attempt to discern how it has been
played out in the constitutional adjudication of equality cases and
how it contributes to, either by reinforcing or ameliorating, women's
subordination. I have selected this distinction as the focus for my
analysis of the impact of the Charter on women's rights both because
feminist theory has identified this distinction as crucial for
understanding how women's oppression is constituted both materially
and ideologically and because it figures prominently within liberal
and legal thought! Although the private and public spheres have
been identified by many feminists with the family and market
6 Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Litigation Works: A Report on LEAF
Litigation Year Two (Agincourt: Carswell, June 30, 1987) at 1. See also M.E. Atchensen, B.
Symes, and M. Eberts, Women and Legal Action: Precedents, Resources and Strategies for the
Future, (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1984) advocating state
funding for equality legislation.
7K. Lahey, "Feminist Theories of (In)Equality" in S. Martin and K. Mahoney, eds, Equality
and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 71 at 85; R. Romanow, "And Justice for
Whom?" (1986) 16 Man. L. J. 102.
8 C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist
Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635.
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respectively,9 liberal political theory defines the market as private
activity while the public sphere is seen as comprising political
activity.10 Thus, what is defined as public or private depends upon
the theoretical stance taken and the purpose for which the
distinction is made.
Moreover, feminist writers have recently begun to identify the
limitations in the initial feminist distinction between public and
private spheres. There has been a growing recognition of the
interconnectedness between family forms and the relations of
production.1 1  The family and the market do not constitute
autonomous spheres with discrete forms of regulation, but rather
reproduction and production are interrelated in complicated and
contradictory ways which change over time.12  While the
public/private distinction has been a central feature of liberal legal
thought, and has historically been used as a rationale to justify the
refusal of the government and the judiciary to intervene in certain
areas, critical analyses of this distinction have a long pedigree - the
thrust of the critique being that the distinction has no determinate
content.13  Rather than demonstrating the falseness of the
dichotomy, what I shall attempt to do is chart how the distinction
has been used in different areas and in different ways to create
barriers for the feminist struggle for substantive equality. 4 I shall
9V O'Donovan, Sevual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1985).
10 M. McIntosh, "The Family, Regulation and the Public Sphere" in G. McLennan et al.,
eds, State and Society in Contenporary Britain (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984) 204 at 204.
1 1 F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983)
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497.
12J. Jenson, "Gender and Reproduction: Or, Babies and the State" (1986) 20 Studies in
Political Economy 9.
1 3 N. Rose, "Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law, Power and the Family" (1987) 14
J. of Law and Soc. 1.
1 4 Rose offers an insightful critique of how the public/private debate has been employed
as critique both by feminists and critical legal theorists to delegitimate the view that law has
a determinate content. Rose argues that this analytic strategy fails to grasp the ways in which
the private family has been linked to new forms of political rationality and has been central to
transformations in subjective realities and desires. Thus, he recommends jettisoning the
public/private distinction for purposes of analysis and adopting instead Foucault's method of
genealogy.
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not endeavour to provide a synopsis of the impressive feminist
literature on the public and private distinction, rather I shall employ
a feminist analysis in order to uncover the assumptions implicit in
many of the decisions concerning equality rights under the Charter.
Thus, I will begin my examination of how the public/private
distinction emerges in relation to the possibilities for Charter
litigation to further the feminist struggle for substantive equality with
a discussion of the public/private distinction as it has developed with
respect to Canadian constitutional adjudication.
I. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION AND CHARTER
ADJUDICATION
The distinction between the private and the public realms
arises in relation to Charter litigation in two important ways. First,
it is used by the courts to determine the scope of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. Secondly, once the hurdle of
the Charter's application is surmounted the distinction arises, albeit
covertly, in the formal approach to equality rights which has typically
characterized liberal constitutional jurisprudence.15  Thus, the
public/private distinction may be used in the first instance to
explicitly deny the Charter's application, and in the second it may be
used to foster a concept of formal legal equality which by denying
the relevance of the history of women's subordinate status
perpetuates it. Consequently, it is crucial that the public/private split
be overcome (or at least eroded) if Charter litigation is to be used
to further feminist struggles.16
Initially, the question of whether or not the Charter applies
to private action or is limited exclusively to public action generated
'5H. Lessard, "The Idea of the "Private": A Discussion of State Action Doctrine and
Separate Sphere Ideology' in C. Boyle et al., eds, Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 107 at 118-119.
16C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1987) at 101-102.
1987]
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a great deal of academic debate.1 7 But the courts, by contrast with
the academics, evinced a great deal of unanimity as to the scope of
the Charters reach1 8 In Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery9 the Supreme Court of
Canada authoritatively stated that for the Charter to apply an
element of governmental action must be implicated in the litigation.
Moreover, the Court distinguished judicial action from legislative,
administrative or executive action in terms of the Charter's reach.20
While admitting that from a political science standpoint the courts
are unquestionably one of the three fundamental branches of
government (legislative, executive and judicial), MacIntyre, on behalf
of a unanimous Court, concluded that to "regard a court order as
an element of governmental intervention necessary to invoke the
1 7 For arguments that the Charter is limited exclusively to public action see: P. W. IIogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 674-78; K. Swinton, "Application
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in W.S. Tarnopolsky and G.A. Beaudoin, ed.,
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Commentary (Toronto: Carswcll, 1982) at 41;
J.D. Whyte, "Is the Private Sector Affected By the Charter?" in L. Smith ct al., Cd., Righting the
Balance: Canada's New Equality (Saskatoon: C.H.R-R., 1986) at 145.
For arguments that the Charter applies to private and public action see: D. Gibson, "The
Charter of Rights and the Private Sector" (1982) 12 Man. L. J. 213; B. Slattery, "The Charter
of Rights and Freedoms - Does it Bind Private Persons" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 149-161; W.R
Lederman, "Democratic Parliaments, Independent Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms" (1985) 11 Queen's L. J. 1.
1 8Re Bhindi and B.C. Projectionists (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 51, 4 B.C.L.R (2d) 145
(B.C.C.A.); Re Blainey and Ont. Hockey Association (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513, 26 D.L.RI (4th)
728, 14 O.A.C. 194 (Ont. CA.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused 58 O.R.
(2d) 274n. Note, however, that Supreme Courts in Saskatchewan and Newfoundland have found
that the common law rule that only a husband can sue for loss of consortium is contrary to s.15
without worrying about the application of s.32: Shkwarchuk v. Hansen (1984), 30 C.C.L.T. 121
(Sask. Q.B.); Power v. Moss (1986), 38 C.C.L.T. 31, 185 A.P.R.5 (Nfld. T.D.).
19(1986), [19861 2 S.C.R. 573, [19871 1 W.W.RI 577 (S.C.C.). [Cited to S.C.R.]
2 0 This holding followed from the Court's premise that the Charter applied exclusively to
public as opposed to private action. At issue in Dolphin was whether the Charter applied to an
injunction issued by a court to give effect to a common law rule prohibiting picketing by a
union against a secondary employer. The question Maclntyre posed was whether the Charter
applied to private litigation divorced completely from any connection with governmental action?
Acknowledging that the Charter itself is ambiguous regarding the scope of its application and
that the academic commentators are divided over the issue, MacIntyre answered the question
negatively. But this did not resolve the issue for there was another question: did the fact that
an injunction had been issued by a court create a sufficient connection with the government for
the Charter to apply? Again, MacIntyre answered in the negative.
[VCOL 25 NO. 3
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Charter would, it seems to me, widen the scope of charter
application to virtually all private litigation."' The Court was not
prepared to allow Charter litigation to intrude upon the private
sphere 2
Although this decision has evoked a great deal of academic
criticism on a number of grounds,23 lower courts have embraced the
decision as a useful corrective to those "errant commentators" who
"initially preached the message that the Charter applied to "all law"
and therefore to all litigation whether or not it involved public or
private litigation."24  Thus, the common law rules of contract,
property and tort which are devised and developed by the judiciary
and enforced by other arms of the state are outside the scope of
Charter scrutiny 5
But while Dolphin clearly establishes, on the one hand, that
common law rules escape Charter scrutiny and, on the other, that
government action in the form of legislation is subject to review,
between these two endpoints a large spectrum of uncertainty exists.
For example, when considering labour relations law is grievance
arbitration,26 the government in its role as employer, a collective
211bid. at 600.
2 2 However, Maclntyre did conclude by suggesting that it might be appropriate to develop
the common law in light of fundamental principles under the Charter.
23See P. Hogg, "The Dolphin Delivery Case: Application of the Charter to Private Action"
(1987) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 273; David Beatty, "Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority
of the Courts" (1987) 37 U.T.LJ. 183 at 188; B. Slattery, "Does Dolphin Deliver?: The
Charter's Relevance to Private Litigation" (1987) 32 McGill L. J. 905. G. Otis notes the
difficulty of making the distinction between private and public action in Quebec where the
Civil Code applies; "The Charter, Private Action and the Supreme Court" (1987) 19 Ottawa L.
Rev. 71 at 87; A. Petter and A. Hutchinson, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie
of the Charter" 8 U.T.LJ. 278.
2 4Re Tonten et.al. and Federation of Women Teachers'Associations of Ontario et.al. (1988)
61 O.R. (2d) 489 at 505 per Ewaschuk.
25Russo v. The Ontario Jockey Club (1988) 43 C.C.L.T. 1 (Ont.H.C.); For a discussion of the
impact of the Charter on labour law, see J. Fudge, "Labour, the Constitution and Old Style
Liberalism" (1988) 13 Queen's L J.
2 6 The question of whether or not the Charter applies to grievance resolution is far from
being resolved. The issue of whether or not the Charter applies to public sector grievance
arbitration has been decided both ways. Here are some cases holding that it does: Re Simon
Frazer University and College Employees(1985),18 LA.C. (3d) 42 (B.C.Arb.Bd.); Re Douglas
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agreement,28 or the internal affairs of a trade union subject to
Charter scrutiny29 ? In deciding each of these questions the judiciary
has unlimited discretion, for it is the judges who decide what
constitutes public and what constitutes private action, and they will
answer these questions in terms of their evaluation of the particular
interests at stake ° Moreover, it is important to recognize that in
deciding that the Charter does not apply in a particular case the
court has made a positive decision, a policy choice, that the
particular action in question will not be scrutinized in terms of its
College and Douglas/ Kwantlea Faculty Assoc. (1986) 26 LA.C. (3d) 176 (B.C.Arb.Bd.); Re
Foothills Provincial General Hospital Board and United Nurses of Alberta (1985), 23 LA.C.(3d)
42 (AltaArb.Bd.). The following cases have held that the Charter does not apply to public
sector grievance arbitration: Re Algonquin College and O.P.S.E.U. (1985), 19 LA.C. 81
(OntArb.Bd.); Re Treasury Board and Kele, Smart and Conroy (1986), 24 L.A.C. (3d) 214
(CanArb.Bd.); and Re Mohawk College and O.RS.E.U. (1986), 23 LA.C. (3d) 347
(OntArb.Bd.).
Arbitrators and labour boards have held that the Charter does not apply to grievance
arbitration in the private sector, see Re Lomer Mining Corp. Ltd., and U.S.W.A., Local 7619
(1983), 14 L.A.C. (3d) 169 (B.C.L.R.B.); ReAlgoma Steel Corp. and U.S.W.A., Local 2251 (1984),
14 LA.C. (3d) 172.
2 7ReLavigne and O.P.S.E.U. (1986), (1986) 55 O.R. 2d 449, 86 C.L.L.C. 14, 039 [additional
reasons] (1987) 60 O.R (2d) 486, 29 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (Ont. S.C.), where the Court held that
a community college was a governmental actor when entering into a collective agreement. In
Stoffman and Vancouver General Hospital (1987), 87 C.L.L.C. 17, 004, 30 D.L.RI (4th) 700, the
B.C. Supreme Court held that the Charter applies to hospitals as they are government agencies
which serve the public. But in McI'nney v. The Board of Governors of Guelph et al. (1987), 87
C.L.L.C. 17,009, (1986), 14 C.C.RL. 1 the Supreme Court of Ontario held that the Charter did
not apply to a university, even though the university was a creature of statute and received
public funding. In O.E.C.T.E.A. v. Essex (County) Roman Catholic Separate School Board,
(1987), 18 O.A.C. 271 the Ontario Divisional Court held that the Roman Catholic Separate
School Board, which was a creature of legislation, was not a government actor in its role as
employer.
28Bhindi,siupra, note 18.
29Baldwin v. B.C. Government Employees Union (1986), 2 C.RR1 312, 3 B.C.L.R (2d)
242(B.C.S.C.) holding that what a union does with compulsory dues is private and, thus, the
Charter does not apply. However, in Cromer v. B.C. Government Teachers' Federation andA.G.
of B.C., [1986] 5 W.W.R. 638, (1986) 4 B.C.L.IR (2d) 273 the B.C. Court of Appeal did not even
address the issue of whether the Charter applied to the union's code of ethics. In Tomen v.
F.WT.O., supra, note 24, Ewasjak of the Ontario Supreme Court held that a union constitution
was private, and thus the Charter did not apply.
30See for example, P. Brest "State Action" (1981-82) 130 U. Pa. L Rev. 1296; H. Lessard,
supra, note 15 at 107; K.E. Kare, 'The Public/Private Distinction in Labour Law" (1981-82) 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358; D. Kennedy, 'The Stages of the Doctrine of the Public/Private Distinction"
(1981-82) 130 U. Pa. L Rev. 1349; A. Petter and A. Hutchinson, supra, note 23.
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possible infringement of rights and freedoms.Y
To date, the courts have generally held that collective
agreements32 and union constitutions3 3 are private and thus beyond
Charter review. Consequently, seniority, productivity, overtime and
premium shift provisions contained in collective agreements cannot
be challenged on the ground that they violate equality protection in
the Chatter, even though research has indicated that such provisions
frequently result in large wage differentials between male and female
employees. 4
It is important to draw out some of the implications of the
courts' private/public distinction for evaluating the use of Charter-
litigation to further feminist struggles in the employment sphere.
The wage relationship is central to women's subordination. Many
feminists have recognized that women's specific oppression is related
to their articulation between the family and wage systems. 5
According to a survey of the impact of the Charter on labour
relations law to October 1987, the cumulative effect of the decisions
is to reinforce the legitimacy of legal relations and categories
(contract and property, public and private) essential to a liberal
political economy.36 Private ordering, even when sanctioned by the
3 1 According to Rodell, "...wherever the power to govern, to make decisions on policy,
indubitably exists, it is used every bit as effectively by a deliberate refusal to use it as by its firm
and forthright use." F. Rodell, Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790
to 1955 (N.Y.: Random House, 1955) at 18-19.
3 2BIidi, supra, note 18.
33 Tonmen, supra, note 24.
3 4 RE. Williams and L.L Kessler, A Closer Look at Comparable Worth (Washington, D.C.:
National Foundation for the Study of Equal Employment Policy) at 20 and E.R Livernash, ed.,
Comparable Worth. Issues and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: Equal Opportunity Advisory
Council, 1980) at 124-6, 153, 157, 193. Moreover, differentials attributed to such provisions are
permitted under the vast majority of equal pay and pay equity legislation. Possibly the Charter
will be of some use in tightening remedial legislation implemented to ameliorate pay
differentials resulting from the ghettoization of women into low paying, dead-end jobs.
However, the success of such challenges will depend upon the approach the courts adopt to the
equality provisions contained in the Charter and the type of remedies they see fit to devise.
3 5 M. McIntosh, "Feminism and Social Policy" (1981) 1 Critical Social Policy 32 and V.
Beechey, Unequal Work (London: Verso, 1987) Chapter 4.
36Fudge, supra, note 25.
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state, is privileged beyond the scope of the Charter in the name of
individual freedom 3 7 This has wide-ranging ramifications for women
workers who tend, for a number of reasons, including their
segregation into the secondary labour market, their childcare
obligations and the historic inability or unwillingness of the labour
movement to organize unions composed primarily of women workers,
to be particularly poorly situated to challenge the employer's
superior bargaining power which is given state sanction through the
common law relations of contract and property3 8 Because the
courts have opted for a liberal approach to the scope of rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, the coercion of privacy remains
intact in the employment relation3 9
But while the Charter will not redress women's (and other
workers') subordination through the wage relation as it is constituted
by the common law of property and contract, the Charter might be
used to redress other areas of women's subordination where state
action, as identified by the court, is directly involved. State action,
typically in the form of legislation or administrative action, is directly
involved in either constituting or ameliorating women's subordinate
position in the following four areas:
1. Protective or remedial labour legislation;
2. The legal recognition and regulation of a specific type of
family;
3. Legislation designed to protect women from sexual
violence or victimization; and
4. The legal regulation of reproduction.40
The first three areas raise equality issues. The significant
question for feminists here is what approach to the equality rights
3 7Baldwin v. B. C. Government Employees Union, supra, note 29; Ehindi, supra, note 18.
38See, for example, P. Armstrong, Labour Pains (Toronto: The women's Press, 1984);
Beechey, supra, note 35; M. Ruggie, The State and Working Women: A Comparative Study of
Britain and Sweden (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1984).
39T. Stang Dahl and A. Snare, "The Coercion of Privacy- A Feminist Perspective" in B.
Smart and C. Smart, ed., Women, Sexuality and Social Control (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1978) at 8.
40This list or categorization is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather is offered as a useful
heuristic for analyzing the problem.
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under the Charter will best alleviate women's subordinate position.
In the United States the debate has centred around whether women
should seek equal treatment with men,41 or whether women should
seek to have their differences from men, whether it be their
biological capacity to bear children, their childrearing responsibilities,
or their economic dependency upon men, recognized as legitimate
grounds for different treatment.42 In general, the similarity approach
has won out, with the difference approach being seen as a necessary
corollary for those areas where women are in fact different from
men, which has typically been limited to women's reproductive
capacities.43  The dominant tendency adopted both in Canadian
feminist legal writing and by Canadian feminist activists is to reject
the formal legal equality approach as insufficient for attaining
substantive equality. Drawing upon the work of MacKinnon, Lessard
argues that formal equality rests upon the "fictive option" of equal
access to the protection of neutral laws, which she describes as
a device which removes the private experience of the oppressed as members of a
discriminated class from legal relevance. So long as the oppressors and the oppressed
are treated equally by the laws, the patterns of actual choices exercised by oppressors
are constitutionally irreproachable because they are private. Thus formal equality
assumes an ideal world where discrimination consists of isolated deviations from the
norm rather than dealing with the real world whose starting point is a widespread
4 1 W. Williams, "American Equality Jurisprudence" in S.L. Martin and K. Mahoney, eds,
Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 115; W. Williams, "The Equality
Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism" (1982) 7 Women's Rts L. Rep. 175.
4 2 L Krieger and P.N. Cooney, "The Miller-Whol Controversy: "Equal Treatment, Positive
Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality" (1983) 13 Golden Gate Univ. L. Rev. 513; A.
Scales, "Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1981) 56 Ind. L. J. 375; L. Krieger, 'Through a
Glass Darkly: Paradigms of Equality and the Search for a Women's Jurisprudence" (1987) 2
Hypatier 45; A.C. Scales, 'le Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" (1987) 95
Yale L. J. 1373.
4 3 RB. Cowan, "Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the American
Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-76" (1976) 8 Col. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 373.
There is, however, a new tendency in American feminist literature to develop an approach to
equality rights for women which falls into neither the "equal" rights or "special" rights camps.
See, for example, the "acceptance" approach offered by CA. Littleton, "Reconstructing Sexual
Equality" (1987) 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279. See S. Law, "Rethinking Sex and the Constitution"
(1984) 32 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955 calling for equal treatment in all areas except reproduction and
also Kay, "Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy" (1985) Berkley Women's L. J. 1.
Alternative nomenclature (result-equality/integrative feminism) has been employed by Boyd and
Sheehy to characterize the different feminist approaches to equality: S.B. Boyd and EA.
Sheehy, "Feminist Perspectives on Law- Canadian Theory and Practice" (1986) 2 CJ.W.L. at
8-13.
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historically determined imbalance.
4 4
Lessard argues that formal legal equality in effect embodies a
public/private distinction which poses an insurmountable barrier to
ending women's subordination.
Thus, most feminists recognize that although formal equality
may be necessary for achieving substantive equality for women, it is
not sufficient.45 As Vickers notes, the Charter was enacted at the
same time as American litigation-based interest groups have become
fed up with the formal notion of equality.46  Recognizing the
limitations inherent in formal equality, various feminists have
advanced contextualized theories of equality which are essential to
the achievement of equality goals for those groups experiencing
systematic social inequality. Feminists, however, do differ as to their
respective analyses of the causes of social inequality. Vickers, for
example, regards social inequality as the consequence of historical
contingency,47 whereas MacKinnon views such inequality as the
result of a systematic distribution of power which subordinates
women to men.48 But regardless of the different perspectives on the
aetiology of women's social inequality, the vast majority of feminists
now advocate a contextualized approach to equality questions which
requires that judicial recognition be given to women's private
experience of subordination.49
4 4Lessard, supra, note 15 at 119.
45Lahey, supra, note 7; Olsen, supra, note 11, 1519.
4 6J. McCalla Vickers, 'Equality Theories and Their Results: Equality-Seeking in a Cold
Climate" in L Smith et al., eds, Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights
(Saskatoon: C.H.R.R., 1986) at 3-4.
4 71bid, and see also J. MeCaller Vickers, "Major Equality Issues of the Eighties" (1983)
1 Can. Hum. Rts Y.B. 47.
4 8MacKinnon, supra, note 16.
49 M. Eberts, "Sex-based Discrimination and the Charter" in A. Bayefsky and M. Eberts,
eds, Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Agincourt: Carswell,
1985) at 183; K. Lahey, supra, note 7, at 71; Lessard, supra, note 15; N.C. Sheppard,
"Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" in Charterwatch, supra, note 15, 195.
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Most feminist theorists are aware that such a contextualized
approach to equality requires the rejection of liberalism 50 For
instead of being content with mere formal equality, the claims of the
"new equality seekers" go "beyond the abstract rights and formal
guarantees to take into account the contingencies of sex, race, age
and handicap which bump against practices central to the operation
of liberal democracy."51  The contextualized approach to equality
requires the court to consider the socio-historic roots of current
inequality.52 Thus, the success of this approach depends, to a large
extent, upon the courts' rejection of the public/private split which is
both implicit in the notion of formal legal equality and a cornerstone
of liberal democracy and jurisprudence.
However, a consensus on the appropriate approach to
furthering feminist goals through equality litigation is merely the
starting point. The success of the endeavour ultimately depends
upon the courts' receptiveness to a contextualized approach to
equality and their willingness to reject traditional concepts of formal
equality. In order to get some sense of how far the courts are
prepared to adopt a contextualized approach it is necessary to refer
to the cases decided to date which have involved sex equality either
directly or indirectly. Whilst it is true that there has been no
authoritative decision by the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the
appropriate approach to equality claims raised under the Charter,
there are now sufficient lower court decisions to indicate general
judicial tendencies. And while the decisions of the lower courts at
this early stage are neither determinative of what the Supreme Court
will say nor the future of equality litigation, these decisions are
important both because they will inevitably affect large numbers of
women and they indicate the kinds of barriers that those invoking
the Charter to further feminist struggles will confront.
Accordingly, I will examine the cases decided to date
involving sex equality claims in each of the three areas where state
action is involved in either constituting or ameliorating women's
5 0 Lessard, supra, note 15; MacKinnon, supra, note 16; Vickers, supra, note 46.
51Vickers, supra, note 46 at 14-15.
5 2 Sheppard supra, note 49 at 219.
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subordinate position: 1) protective or remedial labour legislation;
2) the legal recognition and regulation of a specific type of family;
and 3) legislation designed to protect women from sexual violence
or victimization. After examining each of these areas in succession
I shall attempt to draw some general conclusions regarding the
courts' treatment of sex equality claims. Following that, I will
examine the argument that the attainment of formal legal equality
is a necessary condition for women's substantive equality by focussing
on the legal regulation of reproduction, in particular, the legal
regulation of abortion.
A. Protective or Remedial Labour Legislation
As previously demonstrated, the wage relationship, as
constituted and regulated by the common law of property and
contract, is beyond the scope of Charter review. However, the fact
that employers historically have abused their superior economic
power to the detriment of workers, both male and female, has
resulted in the introduction of minimum standards and collective
bargaining legislation to moderate the rigours of the common law.53
In addition, as part of its general role to facilitate the reproduction
of the social order, the state has introduced legislation designed to
regulate the direct interaction of women's employment and
reproductive requirements. Unemployment and minimum standards
legislation regarding maternity benefits and leave most obviously
straddles the interrelated areas of protective employment legislation
and the legal regulation of reproduction. I shall address each of
these sub-areas of protective labour legislation in turn.
Both the federal and provincial governments have introduced
legislation to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, whether that
discrimination takes the form of job assignment, compensation or
sexual harassment. Such legislation is relevant to equality litigation
53 0ne explanation for the legislation is that each employer has a short term interest in
extracting as much labour power as possible, which might detrimentally affect the employee.
The state, on the other hand, is concerned with the reproduction of the social order as a
whole, and thus must introduce protective legislation to allow workers to reproduce
themselves. See . Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy: A Case Study of
Family, Labour and Welfare Legislation in Canada" in . Dickinson and R. Russell, ed.,
FamiL, Economy and State (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1986) 150 at 161.
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under the Charter in two ways. First, the question is whether this
legislation, if specifically addressed to women workers, violates the
equality provisions contained in section 15(1), or is saved by the
affirmative action protection provided in section 15(2). And second,
judicial interpretation of such legislation is significant because it may
be used as a basis for justifying certain interpretive approaches to
the equality provisions contained in the Charter.
To date there are no decided cases addressing the issue of
whether protective employment legislation other than maternity
related statutory provisions infringe the equality provisions contained
in the Charter. This is not surprising, since most protective
legislation for women, such as prohibitions on sexual harassment for
example, although specifically designed to deal with a social situation
experienced overwhelmingly by women, are couched in gender
neutral language.54 By contrast, affirmative legislation such as the
Pay Equity Act55 recently introduced in Ontario specifically refers to
the gender of the incumbents who traditionally fill specific job classes
in order to proactively address the problem of the gap between
female and male workers' wages which results from the systematic
undervaluation of women's work. Although constituting a prima
facie violation of section 15(1) of the Charter, it is likely that such
legislation will be saved by section 15(2) which protects legislation
designed to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged groups. But
here it is important to note the recent decision of the Manitoba
Court of Queen's Bench which held that since section 15(2) is an
exception to the equality guarantee contained in section 15(1) the
party seeking to uphold the affirmative action plan or provision must
adduce sufficient evidence to persuade the court that the
beneficiaries of the provision are disadvantaged in the context of the
Charter.56 The restrictiveness of the Court's interpretation of
54See, for example, Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c53, s.6(2) dealing with sexual
harassment in the workplace.
5S.o. 1987, c.34.
5 61nApsit v. Manitoba Human Rights Commission (1986), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 277, 22 C.R.R.
134 (Man. Q.B.) the motions judge concluded that an affirmative action plan approved of by
the Manitoba Human Rights Commission constituted a prima facie violation of s.15 of the
Charter, and remitted the case to trial for determination of whether or not the plan was saved
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section 15(2) can only be appreciated in the context of the litigation,
which involved a challenge to an affirmative action plan approved by
the Manitoba Human Rights Commission granting Indian groups
and persons of native ancestry first option to license areas to grow
wild rice.
In other words, the Court refused to take judicial notice of
the historic discrimination against native people in Canada, requiring
instead that the Commission prove it. The question this case raises
is whether such a narrow approach will be adopted by courts
required to rule upon the constitutional validity of affirmative
legislation designed to benefit women, and if so, what sufficient
evidence of women's disadvantaged position is to consist of.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a decision
which might be interpreted as signalling the Court's willingness both
to consider systematic discrimination and to take proactive steps to
redress the consequences of such discrimination. In Action Travail57
the Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal, upheld an order of the Canadian Human Rights Commission
requiring Canadian National Railways to institute an employment
equity program. The program required CN to hire at least one
woman to fill every four job openings until the goal of 13 per cent
female participation in blue collar, non-traditional jobs was reached.
The Court upheld the employment equity program on the grounds
that it was "essential to combat the effects of past systematic
discrimination."58 What has heartened feminists is the Court's broad
definition of systematic discrimination:
systematic discrimination in an employment context is discrimination that results
from the simple operation of established procedures of recruitment, hiring and
promotion, none of which is necessarily designed to promote discrimination. The
discrimination is then reinforced by the very exclusion of the disadvantaged group
under s.15(2). In essence, at trial the issue was whether a policy of giving preference to
people with a native background in the issuance of licences to grow wild rice on designated
Crown land constituted an affirmative action program designed to ameliorate the conditions
of a disadvantaged group. At trial, Simonson held that although the government of Manitoba
had established that native people were disadvantaged, it had failed to establish a reasonable
relationship between the cause of the disadvantage and the form of ameliorative action (1988),
[1988] 1 W.W.R. 629 (Man.Q.B.) at 643.
57Action Travail des Femmes v. C.N.R (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/4210, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114
(S.C.C.) [Cited to C.H.R.R.]
58Ibid at D/4232.
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because the exclusion fosters the belief, both within and outside the group, that the
exclusion is the result of "natural" forces, for example, that 'vomen just can't do the
job:'59
But before one becomes overly sanguine about the
significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Action Travail as
prefiguring a judicial willingness to adopt an approach to equality
rights which will redress the impact of systematic discrimination, it
is important to acknowledge that in this case the Court was
validating the decision of an expert tribunal specifically established
to administer remedial legislation designed to ameliorate, among
other things, sex discrimination in the workplace. By contrast, a
challenge to legislation on the grounds that it violates section 15
requires the court to scrutinize and invalidate legislation on the
grounds that it operates to the detriment of women on account of
a range of historic social and economic factors. This difference of
contexts is crucial, for in the former the court is being asked to
uphold a decision made by an administrative tribunal to adopt an
expansive, remedial interpretation of a governing statute, whereas in
the latter the court is being asked to invalidate legislation on the
grounds of its disparate detrimental impact upon women as a class.60
The very fact that we consider it to be a victory if the court upholds
a remedial interpretation of a statute by a tribunal suggests
something about how the courts have traditionally exercised their
curial power. Thus, while it is logically possible that the courts may
import the type of remedial approach specifically authorized under
human rights legislation into its interpretation of the equality
guarantees contained in the Charter, it is not necessary that they do
so. Much will depend upon the type of legislation being impugned,
the competing interests involved, the persuasiveness of the evidence
of historic disadvantage and the courts willingness to invalidate
legislation on grounds that go beyond formal equality.
59 Ibid at D/4227 quoting Rosie Silberman Abella at 9-10.
6 0In obiter Simonsen, while specifically averting to the Supreme Court's decision in Action
Travail, supra, note 57, in the context of a s.15 challenge to legislation, emphasized the
distinction between human rights statutes and the Charter. See Apsit (1988), supra, note 56
at 647.
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In Weatherall v. Attorney-General of Canada61 the Federal
Court clearly embraced a notion of formal equality, while
simultaneously rejecting a broader sociological perspective on the
continuing significance of male/female power differentials. The
Court held that the use of female prison guards in non-emergency
strip searches of male inmates constituted a pejorative form of
discrimination in the treatment of the sexes. The federal
government sought to justify this activity on the ground that it was
part of an affirmative action programme designed to provide
employment opportunities in federal penal institutions for women,
and thus was saved under section 15(2). The Court found, however,
that the use of female guards for strip searches was not necessary to
their employment in male prisons. Moreover, the Court further held
that the provision in the Penitentiary Service Regulations, C.R.C.
1978, c.1251 which protected female inmates against searches by
male guards, but did not provide comparable protection for male
inmates against searches by female guards constituted a violation of
section 15(1). The Court asserted that:
The distinction cannot be justified on the basis of the suggestion that male guards,
by their inherent maleness are more likely to exploit such situations as cross-gender
searches and surveillance than are female guards that wguld be to give effect to the
kind of stereotyping that [s. 15] was designed to avoid."
However much one might applaud the Court's rejection of
cross-gender searches and its validation of the affirmative action
programme in general, surely the refusal by the Court to recognize
the historic and continuing sexual subordination of women by men
bodes ill for a contextualized approach to equality claims raised
under the Charter. The question this case poses is whether other
courts have adopted a similar notion of formal equality to invalidate
legislation designed to address the sexual coercion of women by men.
Moreover, Weatherall suggests that unless the courts are prepared to
adopt an explicit contextualized approach, protective legislation may
serve to reify concepts of formal equality, rather than address the
61(1987), [1987] 11 F.T.R. 279, 59 C.RI (3d) 247 (Fed.T.D.). [Cited to F.T.IL]. The
Attorney-General launched a successful appeal to several aspects of the Trial Division
disposition. However, the appellant did not challenge the lower court's disposition of the s.15
issue. Weatherall v. Canada [1988] F.C.J. No. 596 (Fed. C.A.).
62Ioid. at 303.
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consequences of women's social and economic subordination.
Minimum standards legislation, or more specifically, statutory
or regulatory exclusions therefrom, has been the subject of at least
one Charter challenge, and another one has recently been
threatened.6 At issue is the exclusion of domestic workers from
certain minimum standards, specifically the requirement to pay
overtime premiums once a stated number of hours has been worked
during a week as provided in the Ontario and British Columbia
Employment Standards Actsf.4 Although the excluded class of
workers, domestics, are described in a manner which is gender
neutral, when the historic incumbency of that class of workers is
averted to the exclusion of domestic workers from overtime pay
clearly has a disparate negative impact on women workers. In
British Columbia a petition challenging the validity of the regulations
issued under the authority of the Employment Standards Act was
dismissed. However, the petition was brought before section 15 was
in effect. Thus, the Domestic Workers' Union was unable to argue
that the exception of domestic workers from overtime pay violated
their right to equal treatment.65
In Ontario, Intercede, the organization representing domestic
workers, managed to obtain legislative amendments to the
Employment Standards Act 66 requiring the employer either to grant
overtime pay or time-off in lieu of overtime. Intercede threatened
6 3Domestic Worker's Union v. A.-G. B.C. (1984) 84 C.L.L.C 14, 004, 1 D.L.IL (4th) 560
(B.C.S.C.) D. King, "Domestic Workers Vow to Continue Challenge of Employment Laws" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (17 May 1988) A18.
64Enployment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.137, O.Reg. 308/87. Employment Standards
Act, S.B.C. 1980, c.10, B.C.Reg. 37/81.s.9(r). See also Employment Standards Act, R.S.A. 1980,
c.E.-10.1 s.2(3)(d). AnActRespectingLabour Standards, S.Q.1979, c.45, RIRtQ. 1981, c.N-11 (s.8
stipulates 53 hours as standard work week for domestics). Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972,
c.10, O.C. No.76-1203 (s.2(1) exempts domestics from all provisions of the Code).
6 5 In Domestic Workers' Union v. A.-G. of B.C., supra, note 63, the petitioner brought an
application to the Supreme Court of British Columbia to challenge the validity of the overtime
pay provisions contained in the Employment StandardsAct Regulation, supra, note 64. Basically
the Domestic Workers' Union argued that by failing to provide for overtime pay for domestic
workers the legislation violated, among other things, s.7 of the Charter. In dismissing the
petition the Court asserted that as s.15 of the Charter was not in effect at the time the petition
was argued before the Court.
6 6 0.Reg.308/87, supra, note 64.
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to initiate an equality challenge under the Charter to the exclusion
of domestic workers from the statutory overtime provisions. Less
than a year later, however, Intercede announced its intention to
proceed with a legal challenge since employers were ignoring
legislation.67 While it is likely that such a challenge will succeed on
the ground that the exclusion of domestic workers from overtime
provisions violates their right to equal treatment with other workers
in a manner that is not justified under section 1 of the Charter, it is
just as likely that successful legislation will not have much impact
upon the plight of domestic workers. Although it is true that the
legislative exceptions for domestics reflects their historic lack of
political influence, judicial action requiring the legislature to treat
domestics the same as other workers for the purpose of overtime
pay will have little material impact on domestic workers. If
employers are willing to ignore the amendments to the overtime
provisions because they do not believe that domestic workers will
enforce their legal entitlements, it is unlikely that further
amendments to the overtime provisions, in the absence of a
significant strengthening of the enforcement provisions, will provide
employers with any greater incentive to obey the legislation. In
situations of abject economic dependence workers' legal entitlements
are rarely effective unless the state adopts a policy of rigorous
enforcement. Thus, formal legal equality for domestic workers is
most likely to be a symbolic, as opposed to, material victory.
Moreover, to obtain a material improvement in the economic lot of
domestic workers the courts would either have to end the profound
economic dependency of domestic worker, or devise an effective
enforcement regime. In either case it would be necessary to
persuade the court that exceptional remedies are required to
alleviate a situation of systematic social and economic subordination.
While it is logically possible that the courts may be so persuaded, in
light both of the their historic rejection of economic dependency as
a reason for judicial action and their overwhelming preference for
invalidating legislation rather than devising positive remedies, it is
highly unlikely that such an argument would be persuasive.
6 7 The [Toronto] Globe and Mail, supra, note 63.
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Prior to 1971, unemployment due to pregnancy was not
indemnified under the Unemployment Insurance Act on the grounds
that it was the predictable result of presumably voluntary sexual
activity. As part of a major overhaul of the unemployment
insurance scheme to close the gaps in welfare provisions, the federal
government amended the Unemployment Insurance Act to provide for
maternity benefits. However, the maternity benefit provisions
imposed by far the most stringent eligibility requirements of any
benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act. Since claimants
otherwise entitled to unemployment benefits would be ineligible if
they were pregnant it was just a matter of time before the maternity
provisions would be challenged as violating the guarantee of equality
under the law contained in the Canadian Bill of Rights.
In its infamous decision in Bliss v. A.G. of Canada the
Supreme Court of Canada held that maternity benefits under the
Unemployment Insurance Act did not contravene the equality
provisions of the Bill of Rights.68 The Supreme Court ruled that the
denial of "regular" benefits on account of pregnancy did not
discriminate on the basis of sex nor deny women equality under the
law. The Supreme Court adopted a narrow procedural, as opposed
to substantive, definition of the equality guarantees under the Bill of
Rights. In addition, it applied the difference principle to resolve the
question of whether differences of treatment on the basis of
pregnancy constituted a form of sex discrimination. While the
Court conceded that the maternity benefit provisions of the
Unemployment Insurance Act had an unequal impact on women and
men, the Court stated that this was due to "nature," and not the
legislation.69 Since pregnant women were not similarly situated to
other claimants different treatment did not constitute unequal
treatment.
Bliss proved to be an unfortunate legal precedent for it has
been relied on extensively to narrow the prohibition against sex
discrimination in employment provided by federal and provincial
68[1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
6 91bid. at 190.
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human rights statutes to exclude pregnancy.70 However, Bliss also
proved to be a rallying cause for feminists organizations. According
to Morton and Pal, Bliss had broad political implications for feminist
objectives.71 After Bliss, feminist organizations began to argue that
since the Bill of Rights had proven ineffective to ensure equality
rights for women, a constitutionally entrenched charter of rights with
stronger and more explicit guarantees was needed. Moreover, these
demands coincided fortuitously with the nation-building agenda of
then Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberal Party. Feminists
groups proved to be crucial allies in Trudeau's constitutional quest.
They effectively bargained their support for a rewording of the
equality rights clause that would preclude any future decisions like
Bliss. What the Canadian people got was section 15 of the Charter
- the most sweeping constitutional guarantee of equality to be found
in any liberal democracy in the world. The key clause of section 15,
"the equal benefit of the law," comes directly from Bliss.72
It is necessary, however, to stand back and critically evaluate
the significance of section 15. Clearly, the impact of Bliss was to
heighten the awareness of feminist organizations as to the
significance of constitutional language when it comes to entrenching
effective equality guarantees. Thus, these organizations managed to
obtain language which on its face appears to preclude the narrow
procedural interpretation to the equality provision which the
Supreme Court offered in Bliss. However, it is important to
recognize that there exists a significant divergence of opinion as to
exactly what section 15 requires. For example, by contrast with the
legislative audits undertaken by feminists groups which have adopted
an aggressive use of the "equal benefit" clause, the audits undertaken
by "provincial governments have tended to adopt a minimalist
methodology that limits the scope of equality rights to statutes
70Leier v. CIP Paper Products Ltd. (1978) (Unreported) (Sask. Board of Inquiry); Gibbs
et.al, v. Bowman et.al. (1978) (Unreported) (B.C. Board of Inquiry); Breton v. Metam: Reynolds
(1981), 2 C.H.R.R D.532 (Que.P.C.); Brooks et.al v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1985), 7 C.H.R.RL
D/3185, 86 C.L.LC. 17,010 (Man.Q.B.).
71pal and Morton, supra, note 3.
721bid. at 153.
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employing sex as a basis of legislative classification. 73  This
approach, predictably, has been criticized by feminists as ignoring
systematic discrimination resulting from laws that are facially neutral
but which reinforce the social subordination of women.
Moreover, it would appear that there are already several
instances where the courts have adopted a narrow approach to
equality rights when interpreting section 15.74 What the courts will
do when faced with the issue of whether or not differential
treatment on the basis of pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination
is not known, and cannot be predicted with any ease if the American
experience is any guide.7s Since the Unemployment Insurance Act
was amended in 1981 to treat pregnant women the same as any
claimant in terms of the requirements for benefits,76 it is difficult to
think of a statute which singles out pregnant women for unfavorable
treatment.
The vast majority of pregnancy discrimination which occurs
does so with respect to work assignments, disability plans and
seniority entitlements. But these sorts of employment issues have
been relegated by the courts to the private sphere, and thus are not
subject to Charter scrutiny. Moreover, the Charter seems to have
little impact in persuading courts to adopt an expansive approach to
questions of sex discrimination in cases where section 15 has not
been argued. Recently, the Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld the
decision of the lower court that a disability plan that treated
pregnant workers differently from other workers regarding benefits
did not constitute prohibited sex discrimination under the provincial
human rights act.77 In so deciding, the lower court followed the
narrow approach to sex discrimination adopted in Bliss, even though
731bid. at 157 (emphasis omitted).
74See cases cited at infra, note 153.
75B. Symes, "Equality Theory and Maternity Benefits" in S.H. Martin and K.E. Mahoney,
eds, Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 207 at 207-8 and also A. Scales,
"Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1981) 56 Ind. L. J. 375.
7 6 Pal and Morton, supra, note 3 at 152.
77Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1986), 7 C.H.R1R. D/3475, 42 Man.R. (2d) 27; (Man.
CA.). Leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted (1987), 46 Man. RI(2d) 79 n.
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it had been distinguished in similar cases.78
Since Bliss, however, four provinces and the federal
government have amended their human rights statutes to provide
explicitly that discrimination on account of pregnancy is sex
discrimination. 79  The legislative recognition that pregnancy
discrimination constitutes a prohibited form of sex discrimination has
had a demonstrative effect on labour arbitrators and adjudicators
even where pregnancy discrimination is not explicitly prohibited.80
But by far the vast majority of the protections for pregnant workers,
however inadequate, have been provided by legislation.81
Paradoxically, the fact that it has required legislation to
protect pregnant workers from discrimination in employment, lends
the protections vulnerable to attack. Whilst it might seem far-
fetched that legislation prohibiting pregnancy discrimination could be
challenged on the ground that it constituted a form of sex
discrimination, this has already occurred in the United States.
In California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guelra82 an employer
challenged California state legislation which provides a woman with
up to four months unpaid maternity leave and guaranteed job
protection upon her return on the ground that it was discriminatory
because it only applied to women and not to men. At first instance
the District Court agreed with the employer and struck down the
legislation because it failed to provide equal treatment for men and
women. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and this
78Brooks, sqpra, note 77.
7 9 The Individual's Rights Protection Act, S.A. 1972, c.2 as am. S.A. 1980, c.27, s.27; Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c.12, as am. L.Q. 1982, c.61; Human Rights Code,
SS.1979, S.-24.1; Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, as am. S.C. 1980-81-82-83,
c.143, s.2.
8 0 Tellier-Colen v. Treasury Board, (1982) 3 C.H.R.R. D/792, 82 C.L.L.C. 17,007 appeal (4
C.H.1R.R D/1169); Holloway v. MacDonald (1983), 83 C.L.L.C. 17,019 4 C.H.RR D/1454;
Paton v. Brower and Co. (1984), 5 C.H.RRt D/1946; Davies v. Century Oils Canada Inc. and
Production Supply Company Ltd., (1987), 8 C.H.RIR. D/3770; Stefanyshyn v. 4 Seasons
Management Ltd. (1987), 8 C.H.R.R D/3934.
8 1 For example, Employment Standards Act, RtS.O. 1980, c.137, PART XI which provides
for maternity leave.
82758 F.2d 390 (9th Circ., 1985)
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in turn was upheld by the Supreme Court.s The majority of the
Supreme Court stated that the since the legislation merely provided
pregnant women with equal employment opportunities it was
consistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964. 4 However,
there was a dissenting opinion to the effect that the legislation
violated the requirement of equal treatment by treating pregnant
women differently from other disabled workers. With the
introduction of the Charter it is possible that analogous maternity
leave provisions contained in employment standards legislation across
Canada could be challenged on the basis that by treating pregnant
women differently from other workers section 15 of the Charter has
been violated8 5 Of course, merely because this argument is available
does not entail that it will succeed; there remains the possibility of
saving the maternity leave provisions under either section 15(2)
and/or section 1 of the Charter. However, time and money may
have to be spent in defence of the status quo, which itself is the
result of struggles by feminists in the legislative arena. Thus, with
the advent of the Charter, legislation designed to redress, however
inadequately, the ability of employer's to discriminate against women
workers in the private sphere is now liable to challenge.
B. The Legal Recognition and Regulation of the Family
The family has always played a central role in feminist
discussions of the public/private distinction. It has traditionally been
regarded as circumscribing the private sphere (women's world), and
it has been contrasted to the public world of the market (men's
93 L.Ed. 2d 613 (1987) (U.S.S.C.).
84See Symes, supra, note 75, 207-210 for a discussion of the dissent.
851n Schacter v. Canada, (1988), 88 C.LLC. 14,021 (Fed. Ct.), a natural father challenged
the unemployment insurance scheme on the ground that the benefits available to adoptive
fathers were not available to natural fathers and hence constituted a violation of s.15 of the
Charter. In his decision, Strayer 3. made it clear that the provisions with respect to adoptive
parents were for the purpose of facilitating child-rearing, whereas the provisions with respect
to natural mothers were for the purpose of facilitating childbearing, and thus Schacter's claim
should not in any way be seen as encroaching upon maternity benefits.
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domain).86  This initial feminist conceptualization of the
public/private split reflected early judicial decisions in both North
America and the United Kingdom which justified different treatment
of men and women in terms of their separate spheres.8 7 Unlike the
courts, however, feminists have not regarded the "sanctity of the
family" as a haven from the competition and struggle of the market,
but rather have perceived it as replicating the broader social
inequalities between men and women. The lack of state intervention
in the family itself, its privacy, has been characterized by Stang Dahl
and Snare as coercive.88 The segregation of women into individual
household units as a method of "privately" ensuring social
reproduction has been seen by feminists as not only contributing to
women's economic and social subordination, but implicating them
emotionally in their subordination to individual men.89
Increasingly, however, feminists have begun to recognize that
the initial conceptualization of the public/private split in terms of the
market/family divide implies an uncritical acceptance that this
distinction is natural, rather than itself created by state action,90 and
disregards the fact that women workers have always been involved
in both the market and the family, often simultaneously. 91 The state,
both through legislation and judicial action, has long been involved
in constituting the family. Only certain types of relationships have
been and continue to be recognized by law as marriages, and only
those legally recognized relationships may enjoy state provided
8 6 M. O'Brien, "Reproducing Marxist Man" in L.M.G. Clark and L. Lange, eds, The Sers,
of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction fron Plato to Nietzsche (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1979) at 99; M. Thorton, "Feminist Jurisprudence: Illusion or
Reality" (1986) 3 Aust. J. of Law and Soc. at 5-9.
8 7For a discussion of the emergence of the separate spheres ideology in Britain and the
United States, see A. Sachs and J.H. Wilson, Sexism and the Law (Oxford: Martin Robinson,
1978).
88Stang Dahl and Snare, supra, note 39 at 14.
89M. Barrett, Women's Oppression Today, (London: Verso, 1986) at 247.
9 0M. McIntosh, "'The State and the Oppression of Women" in A. Kuhn and A.M. Wolpe,
eds., Feminism and Materialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) at 254.
9 1 Ursel, supra, note 53.
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benefits. While it is true that "common law" relationships, relations
not formally sanctioned by the state or church through the institution
of marriage, are now recognized for the purpose of obtaining
benefits from the state, a wide range of long-term mutually
supportive relationships other than heterosexual couplings have been
denied legal recognition for the purpose of making claims upon the
state.9 2 Moreover, the long history of protective legislation relating
to maximum hours of work for women and the more recent
regulation of the interplay between women's reproductive and
employment needs provide indisputable evidence of the state's
recognition that women have had, and continue to have, joint and
often contradictory responsibilities in both spheres 3 And it is
exactly this dual responsibility that results in women's subordination;
women's childrearing duties have resulted in their disadvantaged
position in the labour market, and this, in turn, has contributed to
their continuing economic dependence upon men. And when
women are unable to undertake remunerated employment because
of their childbearing and rearing responsibilities, the state has
required women to establish that they are not economically
dependent upon men as a condition for obtaining state benefits for
their own and their children's subsistence.
Thus, it is important that feminists do not allow the
pervasiveness of the "ideology of privacy" to obscure the fact that,
and the degree to which, the state is implicated in both the
constitution and regulation of the family. But once the appropriate
household unit is constituted by the state, the family is left in privacy
to regulate its internal affairs to the extent that it conforms to state
norms. And more significantly perhaps, the very constitution of the
household unit as the site of social reproduction, that is, the
fulfillment of the material and emotional needs of the members of
society, minimizes the extent to which the state is involved in
9 2 M. Leopold and W. King, "Compulsory Heterosexuality, Lesbians and the Law: The Case
of Constitutional Protection" (1985) 1 CJ.W.L 163-186.
93J.M. Boulding, "Minimum Wages - Protective Legislative for Women" (Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, 1988) [unpublished]; M.E. McCallum, "Keeping Women in Their Place:
The Minimum Wage in Canada 1910-1925" (1986) 17 Labour/Le Travail 29. In the United
States see JA. Baer, The Chains of Protection (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978); S. Lehrer,
Origins of Protective Legislation for Women, 1901-1925 (Albany- SUNY, 1987).
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fulfilling the material needs of its citizens. Ultimately, the family is
dependent upon the "family wage" of the male worker, who sells his
labour power in order for both himself and his dependents to
subsist. But because no individual capitalist is concerned with the
reproduction of the social order as a whole, but rather with the
extraction of the maximum amount of surplus labour value, the state
must step in to ensure that exploitation does not exceed the point
at which workers are not able to fulfill their material needs.9 4
However, the state intervenes in a manner so as to ensure that the
vast majority of the material needs of its citizens are met privately
within the household unit which is supported by the male wage.
Consequently, there is a presumption that women are economically
dependent upon men, and only when that presumption is rebutted
will the state step in to meet, however minimally, the needs of
women and children. According to Zaretsky,
the rise of the state in modem history does not take over the responsibilities and
functions from the family so much as it accompanies a shift from patriarchal to a
private, ostensibly non-political family unit. Rather than the state replacing the
family, the modem nation-state and modem family emerged together as the necessary
compliment of one another, each applying and presupposing the other. In order to
see the connection between them, it is necessary to conceptualize the market economy
as the crucial mediation first in securing the political rights of the private individual
(or the family unit) and later as supplying the means by which interdependence and
altruism was to be achieved.... The redefinition of the family in terms of private
property established it as an "autonomous"ealm and was associated with a pushing
back of government's power to intervene.
91
The legislative and administrative activity involved in
constituting and regulating the family is clearly public action in
terms of the liberal distinction between public and private activity
and, as such, is subject to Charter scrutiny. But, once the family is
granted legal recognition because it conforms both to the "ideal
family" and the norms of behaviour established by regulatory
agencies, its internal activities are deemed to be private and,
consequently, the Chater does not apply. However, a range of
equality issues arise with respect to the differential treatment of men
and women in relation both to the legal recognition of the family
94Ursel, supra, note, 53.
95E. Zaretsky, "Rethinking the Welfare State: Dependents, Economic Individualism and
the Family" in J. Dickinson and B. Russell, eds, Family, Economy and State (Toronto:
Garamond, 1986) at 96-97.
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and benefits provided by the state. I shall examine a number of
these cases in terms of both the approaches to equality they adopt
and the assumptions they reflect. In the first group of cases I shall
consider, women have sought to invoke the Charter's guarantee of
equality to extend legal recognition either to individual family
members or to non-traditional "families" for the purpose of claiming
state benefits. By contrast, the second group of cases all involve
equality challenges by men to legislation designed specifically to
address women's economic subordination.
Feminists first sought to use the equality guarantees
contained in the Charter to attack those few remaining statutes
which denied formal equality to men and women in marriage. 96 In
1985 LEAF initiated several cases across the country challenging
provincial statutes which restricted women's options for naming
themselves and their children. By precluding a married woman from
using a name other than her husband's or from passing her surname,
rather than her husband's, on to her children, LEAF asserted that
the legislation violated the equality rights provided under the
Charter. In two instances this argument was accepted by the
courts,97 and in the face of similar litigation several other provinces
amended their legislation to reflect LEAF's demand for formal legal
equality in respect of a married woman passing on her surname to
her children.98
The success of this litigation demonstrates the courts'
96Charter of Rights Education Fund, Report on the Statute Audit Project (January 1985) at
1.3-1.7, which conducted an independent audit of legislation for potential violations of s.15 of
the Charter. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the government audit of provincial and
federal legislation see M. Eberts, "Sex-based Discrimination and the Charter" in A. Bayefsky
and M. Eberts, eds, Equality Rights and The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto:
Carswell, 1985) at 195.
9 7Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), Litigation Works: A Report on LEAF
Litigation Year Two (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 4-5, 19. K. Tummon, "Re Paul and Wright:
Children's Surnames and the Equality of Married Women" (1986) 1 CJ.W.L. 547; S.P. Boivin,
"The Surname of the Married Woman and of Children" in E. Sloss, ed., Family Law in Canada:
New Directions (Ottawa: Can. Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1985) at 195-210.
98However, in both Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick the legislation was amended
to restrict married people to the use of one surname for all of their children, rather than
allowing the parents to pass on either surname as they saw fit. LEAF is considering whether
or not to challenge this legislation. See LEAF, supra, note 6 at 5.
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willingness to accept arguments advocating formal legal equality
when issues of obvious symbolic, though of little material, import are
raised. The symbolic significance of these decisions in establishing
the right of a married woman to maintain a separate formal legal
identity from her husband's when married, and to pass on her name
to her children, should not be underestimated. However, the
attainment of such formal equality does nothing in itself to further
substantive equality for women either within or outside of marriage.
The question this type of case poses is whether this symbolic
affirmation of women's separate legal identity from men cashes out
when material interests are involved.
Although courts have responded to formal equality arguments
in order to grant legal recognition to married women, to date the
Ontario Supreme Court has refused to extend legal recognition to
cohabiting same sex partners for the purpose of obtaining dependent
coverage under the Ontario Health Insurance Act.99 In Andrews v.
Minister of Health1°° the applicant sought, among other things, a
declaration that to the extent that the Act and regulations precluded
coverage of cohabiting same sex partners as dependents, the statute
and its subordinate legislation violated section 15. Although
cohabiting heterosexual couples receive dependent coverage,
homosexual couples living together in a domestic situation are
classified as single persons and must pay single person premiums. 101
In addressing the equality issue McRae J. adopted a formal three-
step approach which appears so far to have overwhelmingly found
favour with the courts:
Those challenging the law must:
(1) identify the class of individuals who are alleged to have been treated differently,
(2) demonstrate that the class purported to be treated differently from another class
is similarly situated to that other class in relation to the purpose of the law,
99ILS.O., 1980, c.197, Ont. Reg. 452/80, ss.l(c),(b),111(2).
100(1988) (Unreported) (Ont.S.Ct.).
101Counsel forAndrews also argued that the provision also violated ss.2(d) and 7, but these
arguments were given short shrift by the courts.
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(3) show the difference in treatment is discriminaj T in the sense of a pejorative or
invidious purpose or effect of the impugned law.
McRae identified homosexual couples living together in a domestic
situation as the distinct class. As to whether this class was similarly
situated to heterosexual couples he asserted:
Homosexual couples are not similarly situated to heterosexual couples. Heterosexual
couples procreate and raise children. They marry or are potential marriage partners
and most importantly they have legal obligations of support for their children whether
born in wedlock or out and f% their spouse.....A same sex partner does not and
cannot have these obligations. 3
And finally he held that the distinction was not discriminatory
because same sex cohabitants are treated in exactly the same manner
as all other unmarried (whether in the legal or "common-law" sense)
people in the province!04 Moreover, McRae J. sought to further
justify his decision in light of his characterization of the purpose of
the Act, which he saw as "to promote and assist with the
establishment and maintenance of families" through "a scheme of
health insurance which benefits all Ontario residents with particular
assistance to spouses and dependent children in the more
"traditional" heterosexual context."105
Not only does this decision adopt a narrow, formal approach
to the equality rights under the Charter, more importantly, and much
more damagingly, it clearly adopts, endorses and perpetuates a
familial ideology, wherein the ideal family is still taken to mean a
social relationship sanctified by law and preferably by a recognized
religion, comprising an adult male, female adult, and their biological
or adopted children! 0 6 Implicit in familial ideology is the belief that
the "ideal" or "traditional" family is normal. The danger of this





1 0 5lbid. at 12. He went on to say that a line must be drawn somewhere.
1 0 6 SA.M. Gavigan, "Law, Gender and Ideology" in A. Bayefsky, ed., Legal Theory Meets
Legal Practice (Edmonton: Academic, 1988) 283 at 293.
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and thereby ensuring, that there is but one family form, reproduces
and reinforces the subordination of women. 10 7
This decision is part and parcel of a well-established judicial
proclivity to define spouse in such a way as to deny same-sex couples
the benefits granted to heterosexual couples.108 Although the
possibility of using the Charter to end discrimination against
cohabiting lesbians and gays has been mooted in several government
background papers, the success of this endeavour will depend upon
the tenacity of familial ideology. But at the same time as the
rhetoric of the family is reaching a feverish pitch in public debate,10 9
there is evidence of chinks in the pervasiveness of familial ideology.
Protections in human rights statutes are being extended to include
sexual preference and there is some evidence that members of the
Supreme Court of Canada may not be opposed to extending equality
protections to homosexuals. 110 Thus, legislation and Charter-litigation
provide two avenues for challenging both the assumptions and effects
of familial ideology. Whether the later tactic will prove successful
remains to be seen.
The decisions in the next two cases, which both involve
equality challenges by men to legislation designed to alleviate the
dire economic circumstances of sole support mothers, appear on
their face to be inconsistent. In Shewchuk v. Ricard1 1 the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held that legislation which allowed a
single mother to sue the natural father of her child without
1071bid. at 294.
108Leopold and King, supra, note 92 at 166-9.
109The assault on feminism by the pro-family right is being lead by REAL women of
Canada. The President of the National Committee on the Status of Women, which led the
drive for equality rights in the Charter, felt compelled to adopt the 'pro-family' rhetoric insisted
upon by REAL Women: "[w]e agree with Real Women's goals of preserving family values and
integrating family life into government policies..." (S. Cameron, "Homey Muffins, Pink
Brochures Belie REAL Women's Focus" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 Dec. 1986) A 1,5.
See also the discussion of the recently-established men's groups such as, "In Search of Justice,"
and the "Canadian Council for Family Rights," an umbrella group for about twenty groups in
National Association of Women and the Law (1988) 8(3) Jurisfenme 9-13.
1 1 0 Leopold and King, supra, note 92 at 185.
111(1986), 24 C.R.R. 45, 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 324 (B.C.C.A.).
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providing a similar right for natural fathers did not infringe the
Charter. However, in both Attorney General of Nova Scotia v.
Phillips12 and Reference Re Family Benefits Act (N.S.), Section 5113
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal struck down a statutory provision
which provided family benefits to single mothers with dependent
children on the grounds that it did not provide equivalent benefits
to single fathers with dependent children. Although seemingly
inconsistent, once the objectives of the respective statutes and the
actual impact of the decisions are considered the two decisions are
remarkably consistent.
Shortly after Vicki Louise Shewchuk gave birth she filed a
complaint under the Child Paternity and Support Act114 alleging that
Ricard was the father of her child. When the complaint came
before the provincial court, Ricard argued that the Act violated
section 15 since the consequences for non-compliance with an order
under the Act were directed solely at the putative father, without
providing an analogous remedy against a mother who abandoned her
child leaving the father with the sole responsibility for support. This
unequal treatment, Ricard asserted, constituted discrimination which
could not be justified under section 1. The Provincial Court
accepted Ricard's argument, and issued a declaration that the Act
was of no force or effect.115 The Attorney General then applied to
the judge to state a case, which resulted in the initial decision being
overturned 1 6 Ricard appealed from that decision, and five groups
concerned both about the general issue of the effectiveness of the
equality guarantees in the Charter and the particular problems of
low-income women and single mothers were given permission to
intervene.
Ricard conceded before the British Columbia Court of
Appeal that the Child Paternity and Support Act had a rational and
112(1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 633, 26 C.RR. 322 (N.S.CA.).
113(1986), 75 N.S.R(2d) 338, 26 CR.R. 336 (N.S.C.A.).
1 14 RS.B.C. 1979, C.49.
115(1986), 17 C.RRPI 117, [1985] 6 W.W.R. 427 (B.C.Prov.Ct.).
116(1985), 20 Cr-.R. 364, [1985] 6 W.W.R. 436 (B.C.s.C.).
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constitutional purpose which was to provide support for illegitimate
children. However, what he continued to object to were the
different, and much more coercive remedies, provided to mothers as
opposed to fathers when it came to enforcing an obligation for child
support. The majority of the Court agreed that the different
treatment of women and men under the Act constituted a prima
facie case of discrimination which was not saved under section
15(2).7 However, the Court held that the statutory violation of the
equality right was a demonstrably justified limitation under section
1.
The Court of Appeal's analysis of the objective of the
statutory scheme bears repeating in full:
The principal reason for the Child Paternity and Support Act is to identify the father
of the illegitimate child. That is the fundamental question to be decided before the
broad objectives of providing financial assistance to a mother and to a child, and of
relieving the state from that obligation, can be met.
It is important to note that the state, through the superintendent, may
apply for the affiliation order, and the superintendent, as well as the mother, may
be provided by a municipality with legal assistance. The obligations of tile father and
mother to support the child, and the means of establishing the quantun of maintenance,
are subsidiary to the broadpublicpurpose of the legislation, namely, to establish paternity
and therefore provide a basis for shifting the fina t5i responsibility for the child from the
public to the private donmain.(emphasis added)
In effect, what the Act provides is a mechanism for the state to
transfer the economic responsibility for single mothers with
dependent children from the state to the natural father. Moreover,
even if an impecunious woman does not want to maintain a
relationship, albeit one solely of an economic nature, with the man
who fathered her child, the state may override her wishes in order
to establish the economic claim. Thus, the courts are willing to
117Nemetz, CJ. stated that the legislation did not violate s.15 as there was a biological
justification for the difference in treatment - women bear children.
118Supra, note 111. In Friesen v. Gregory (1986), 55 Sask. R. 245 (Sask. Unified Fam. Ct.),
similar Saskatchewan legislation was challenged on the grounds that by not entitling unwed
fathers to sue natural mothers for the support of illegitimate children a violation of s.15(1) of
the Charter had occurred. Dickson J. found the impugned statutory provision to constitute a
prima facie violation of s.15(1). Dickson was of the opinion that the provision was saved by
both ss.1 and 15(2). He held that since it was designed to "identify the father and impose upon
him some or all of the support burden" the legislative provision constituted "a pressing and
substantial concern in any community. If it is not pursued, the child and the mother may suffer
deprivation and the community may have to bear the financial burden of providing them the
bare necessities of life." (at 248) Thus, like Shewchuk the Court was prepared to condone
discrimination on the basis of sex so long as it promoted the privatization of the costs of social
reproduction.
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uphold legislation which privatizes the costs of social reproduction
even to the extent that the legislation denies the formal equality of
men and women.1 19
In A.G. V. Phillips120 and Re Family Benefits Act
Reference12 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal unanimously decided
that a provision of the Family Benefits Act entitling single mothers
with dependent children to state benefits violated section 15 of the
Charter since it did not provide similar benefits for single fathers
with dependent children. The Court held that so long as there were
single fathers similarly situated with dependent mothers regarding
their economic circumstances legislative discrimination in favour of
women could not be justified, even though there are many more
women than men in need of such assistance. The Court rejected the
argument that the benefits to single mothers should be characterized
as an affirmative action programme. Characterizing the object of the
Act as the relief of poverty, the Court also asserted that the
legislation could not be saved by section 1 since the government did
not demonstrate "that the distinction between males and females
under the Family Benefits Act bears any true relationship to the
relief of poverty." 22 Obviously, the Court was not cognizant of the
overwhelming statistical evidence of the fact that single mothers
constitute an increasingly high percentage of Canadians officially
classified as poor.1 3
But the most significant aspect of the decisions in Phillips
was the Court of Appeal's affirmation of the lower court's
categorical refusal to remedy the legislative violation of the Charter
119Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied. (1987), 28 C.tPRR 192n, 10




123MJ. Mossman and M. MacLean, "Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a New
Equality," (1985) 5 Can. . Fain. L. 79; National Council of Welfare, Poverty Profile 1988
(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1988) at 65-84; R. Sidel, Women and Children Last
(N.Y.: Penguin, 1986).
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
by extending the benefits to men. Noting that two other provinces
had amended similar statutes to cover dependent fathers and thus
remedy the violation of section 15, the Court refused to "act like a
legislature" by committing the government to an increase in social
benefits spending.124 In fact, what the Court did was strike down
the provision which bestowed benefits upon dependent mothers.
Thus, the extension of financial benefits to dependent fathers
continues to depend upon a positive legislative act.
The decisions of the respective provincial appellate courts in
Shewchuk and Phillips are consistent if the judicial characterization
of the object of the impugned legislation is considered. In Shewchuk
the statute treated men and women dissimilarly by enabling both
single mothers and the state to make economic claims for child
support against the man who fathered the child in order to shift at
least part of the cost from the public purse to the father. Thus, a
legislative violation of formal equality was upheld on the ground that
its purpose was to privatize the costs of social reproduction. In
Phillips, by contrast, the object of the Family Benefits Act was
characterized as the alleviation of poverty in general, although there
is a clear social trend which demonstrates the increasing feminization
of poverty.125 Because the Court chose to characterize the purpose
of the impugned legislation as the amelioration of poverty in general,
it was not prepared to save legislation which violated the principle
of formal equality. Moreover, it ignored the urgings of the
respondent father to extend the benefits to single fathers, and
remedied the discriminatory aspect of the statute by denying benefits
to single mothers. Thus, the immediate impact of both Shewchuk
and Phillips was the same - it lessened the financial burden of the
state in terms of providing economic benefits to impoverished
families.126
124Phillips, supra, note 112.
125Supra, note 122. For a discussion that the term "feminization of poverty" as ignoring
the significance of the connectedness with class and race see Fox-Genovese, infra, note 210, 345.
126To date, with the exception of Schacter, supra, note 85, although a number of courts
have been urged to remedy the defects of social welfare legislation that discriminates against
a particular group of otherwise deserving people by extending the benefits of the legislation to
them, the preferred judicial option is to strike down the benefits. For a discussion of this
judicial proclivity see A. Petter, "Backwards March: The Political Wrongs of Charter of Rights"
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The decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Re
MacVicar and Superintendent of Family and Child Services et a1127 is
the inevitable corollary of the decision in Shewchuk where a natural
father's economic responsibility for his children was reaffirmed.
MacVicar involved a petition by a father for an order restraining the
placement for adoption of his daughter on the grounds that the
provision of the Adoption Act requiring the consent of the natural
mother or the natural father who is married to the mother before
a child can be placed for adoption violates section 15 of the Charter.
MacVicar maintained that the Adoption Act discriminated on the
basis of sex and marital status against himself and other fathers who
never married the mother of their child . Moreover, as MacVicar
indicated, both the Child Paternity and Support Act and the Family
Relations Act impose a duty upon a father to contribute to the
support of his child even if he has not married the child's mother.
According to MacVicar, it would be unfair to impose a duty to
support a child if the father is not given a corresponding right to be
informed of, or consent to, the impending adoption of his child.128
Characterizing the purpose of the Adoption Act as promoting
the welfare and best interests of a neglected or unwanted children
by providing them with new homes, the Court found that the
consent provisions in the statute created a distinction between
natural mothers and natural fathers and a further distinction between
natural fathers who marry the natural mother and natural fathers
who do not. Since the Court was persuaded that natural mothers
and natural fathers were similarly situated having regard to the
purpose of the Act, it found that the distinction on the basis of sex
created an inequality.129  Moreover, the Court found that the
(Seminar on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, University of Edinburg, May 20-
21, 1988) [unpublished].
127(1987), [1988] 29 C.R. 37, 34 D.LI.L 488 (B.C.S.C.)[cited to C.R.R.]. See also
Hardcastle v. Huctlak, discussed in the Lawyers' Weekly (Jan. 15), 1988 wherein the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted that a s.15 argument might well apply to a case where
a 20 year old father claiming custody of his child over the wishes of the natural mother to give
the child up for adoption.
1281bid. at 41.
1 2 91bid. at 46.
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discrimination could not be justified under section 1. Acknowledging
that the requirement of the consent of natural fathers who are not
married to the natural mother of the child might slow down the
adoption process, the Court noted that the consent of both the
natural divorced father and the mother was required, even though
they both might be difficult to find. Thus, the Court held that
[t]o separate a natural father permanently from his child without his consent, with
notice dependent on the goodwill of the mother or the concern of a judge, is an
effect entirely disproportjtate with the benefit of that provision to the community,
the mother or the child.
And unlike Phillips, where the court refused to extend benefits in
order to remedy discriminatory legislation, the Court in MacVicar by
granting the restraining order implicitly extended the requirements
of notice of and consent to adoption to all natural fathers. Thus, it
would appear that courts are more likely to extend procedural
protections to omitted classes of persons in order to save
discriminatory legislation than they are to extend financial benefits
bestowed under welfare legislation to remedy a similar defect.131 In
the circumstances of MacVicar, where the father had an ongoing
relationship with his daughter, this requirement does not appear
either to be unduly onerous nor privilege the rights of paternity in
a situation beyond where it might be warranted. However, if the
consent of a natural father to adoption is required across the board
it is possible to think of many situations where the mere connection
of genetic paternity will give men rights over children. Thus, this
decision tends to reinforce paternal control over children. The
question is how far the courts will be prepared to extend this; will
they, for example, be prepared to extend the natural father's rights
to require a woman to notify the natural father of her decision to
1301bid. at 50.
13 1 Contrast MacVicar with Phillips, supra note 112. Moreover, regardless of what the
courts do, the legislature can still undermine any progressive action by the courts. See, for
example, the B.C. government's response to the result in Silano v. R in right ofBritish Cohtmbia
(1987), 16 B.C.L.RI (2d)113, [1987] 5 W.W.R. 739 (B.C.S.C.). After the court struck down a
distinction based on age, the government raised the level of welfare payments to those under
26 and decreased the payments to those over 26 so that both groups would receive the same
amount.
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have an abortion?132
Several themes emerge from the preceding examination of
the decided cases which have involved Charter challenges against
aspects of the legal regulation of the family. On the one hand, the
demand for formal equality has been used by feminists to obtain a
symbolic victory enabling married women to maintain their own
names,133 while on the other, it has been used by men to deprive
women of important material benefits provided by the state.134
Irrespective of the significance of symbolic victories, it is clear that
they are not sufficient for ensuring material improvements in
women's lives. And at the same time as state benefits have been
struck down on the grounds that they violate the equality guarantees
of the Charter, discriminatory legislation which provides recourse
against natural fathers for the economic support of their children has
been upheld on the grounds that it shifts the burden of social
reproduction from the public to the private domain. It is impossible
to regard a decision that reinforces women's economic dependency
upon men by privatizing the obligation for support as a progressive
victory.135 Moreover, familial ideology has presented a barrier to
members of non-traditional family units who seek to rely on the
equality guarantees to obtain state benefits which are available to
traditional families. While the Charter may be used to slowly chip
away at the ideology of familism, it is difficult to see how it can be
used to shift the burden of social reproduction from the private
sphere to the public sphere having regard to the courts' institutional
1 3 2 See Gavigan's informative discussion of the legal requirements for spousal notification
and consent to abortion; SA.M. Gavigan, "Women, Law and Patriarchal Relations: Perspectives
within the Sociology of Law" in N. Boyd, ed., The Social Dimensions of Law (Toronto: Prentice
Hall, 1986) 101 at 110-12.
13 3 Sce text, supra, at notes 97 to 99.
134Supra, note 112.
135Margret Eichler has made the point that the state benefits financially from the
designation of the family as "private" since this ideology legitimates minimal state provision for
welfare. M. Eichler, Families in Canada Today (Toronto: O.I.S.E. Press, 1983) at 274; S. Boyd
and EA. Sheehy, supra, note 44 at 30-31. A central demand of feminism is that the state either
directly supply women with adequate material resources or provide women with realistic
opportunities such that they can provide themselves and their children with an acceptable
standard of living.
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limitations. And finally, formal equality has been invoked to extend
paternal control over children. Thus, in general, the cases illustrate
what amounts to either a profound unwillingness or inability on the
part of the courts to regard the different treatment of men and
women in terms of the legal regulation of the family as in any way
related to the subordination of women either within or without the
family.
C. Legislation Designed to Protect Women from Sexual Violence or
Victimization
Paradoxically, the first rash of equality cases to hit the courts
consisted of attempts by male defendants to invoke the guarantees
of sex equality contained in section 15 of the Charter to invalidate
legislation which was specifically designed to protect women from
sexual violence and victimization. In the majority of these cases the
arguments for formal equality have been successful, with the result
that the sexual protection legislation has been struck down. In those
cases where the courts were willing to uphold the legislation, they
did so not on the grounds that it was necessary to counteract the
widespread and pervasive sexual violence against women in our
'society, but rather on the ground that it was necessary to protect
young women from their own biological capacities.
The greatest number of such cases involve constitutional
challenges to section 146 of the Criminal Code, which provides that
every male person who has intercourse with a female person who is
under the age of fourteen years and who is not his wife is guilty of
an offence. The argument is that since females cannot be charged
with the analogous offence of having intercourse with a male under
the age of fourteen years, section 146 discriminates against men on
the basis of sex in a manner which cannot be justified under sec-
tion 1 of the Charter. While all of the lower courts have found
section 146 to constitute a prima facie violation of section 15, a
slight majority of them have found that the violation was justified
under section 1. The lack of consistency in the results is attributable
to different judicial characterizations of the purpose of the provision.
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In R. v. Monk1 36 the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench
characterized section 146 as "designed to suppress child pregnancies
- a risk to which male children are not exposed". Consequently, the
different treatment of young women and young men was
demonstrably justified under section 1. Several other courts have
also upheld section 146 on the grounds that it was designed to
protect young women from becoming pregnant 37 By contrast, in R.
v. Lucas,13 8 although the Ontario District Court took judicial notice
of the biological differences between males and females, the Court
held that in the absence of persuasive psychological or sociological
evidence to the contrary, "it seems only fair and appropriate that
protective laws should provide equal protection for both male and
female persons who might be preyed upon by adults by either
sex."139  The Court held that since section 146 violated the Charter
no prosecution could be maintained against the accused. Revoking
the legislative protection afforded to young women on the grounds
that similar protection is not provided for young men seems a
somewhat perverse result if the court's overall concern was
protecting young people from sexual victimization.
Since there is almost equal authority both for upholding and
invalidating section 146, it is impossible to predict the responses of
the various levels of appellate courts to the argument that section
146 violates the Charter. Moreover, even if it were socially
preferable to extend the protections of section 146 to young men
who were being sexually victimized by older women in order to save
the legislation, no matter how anomalous such situations may in fact
be, it is unlikely that the courts would be prepared to do this.
Rather, the likely result would be that the protections offered to
young women would be invalidated. But regardless of the actual
results of the various challenges, what is most significant about these
136(1985), 43 Sask. R. 318 (Sask.Q.B.).
1371d.; R. v Bearhead (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 546, 22 C.R.R 211 (Alta Q.B.); Regina v
M.E.D.(1985), 47 C.R. (3d) 382 (Ont.Prov.Ct.).
138Regina v Lucas (1985), 16 C.R. 1, 6 C.H.RR. D/3002 (Ont.Dist.Ct.), reversed on
other grounds (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 229, 20 C.RR- 278, 51 C.R (3d) 296 (Ont.C.A.)
13 9Ibid. at 7.
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cases is the complete absence of any willingness on the part of any
of the courts to take judicial notice of the systematic sexual
victimization of women by men.140 When the courts uphold the
legislation they do so on the basis of biology, rather than social
relations of victimization. 41
The ease with which the courts are willing to embrace
arguments of formal equality in order to strike down legislation
designed to protect women from sexual victimization is clearly
evident in R. v. Howell.142 In that case the accused applied to the
District Court of Newfoundland to quash an indictment charging him
with having had sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter contrary to
s.153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The grounds were that the section
had no effect as it violated the guarantee against sex discrimination
contained in section 15. Specifically, the accused argued that his
right to equal treatment was violated because a stepmother having
intercourse with her stepson would not have committed an offence.
Riche C.D.J. asserted that young children of both sexes were
similarly situated with respect to the harmful effects of sexual
intercourse. Moreover, he went on to state that
[e]ven in the case of pregnancy although in most cases the burden and responsibility
for the child falls upon the female this does not mean that a male person can always
walk away from such an experience and forget it. The stepmother who has sexual
intercourse with her teenage stepson and as the result becomes pregnant may place
substantial responsibilities upon that boy's shoulder....Should the mother die he could
be saddled with the responsibility of bringing up that M1ld. This could adversely
affect his opportunity to find a normal life for himself.
In order to show that the offence violated the equality guarantees
of the Charter, Riche constructed a hypothetical situation which
broached the absurd in order to demonstrate the harsh impact of
1 4 0 L. Clark and D. Lewis, Rape: the Price of Coercive Sexuality (Toronto: The Women's
Press, 1977); S. Estrich, Real Rape: How the Legal System VictimiLzes Women Who Say No
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); C. Boyle and S. Worth Rowley, "Sexual Assault
and Family Violence: Reflections On Bias" in Equality and Judicial Neutrality, supra, note IS
at 312.
141R.v. Howell, (1986), 26 C.R.R. 267, 57 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 198 (Newfoundland District
Court).
1421bid.
1 4 31bid. at 275.
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pregnancy upon young men, while simultaneously ignoring the
profound negative impact that pregnancy might have upon a young
woman who, while biologically able to give birth, was psychologically,
emotionally and economically unprepared to do so.
The decisions of the lower courts illustrate an egregious
ignorance of the extent of the sexual victimization of women. But
this can hardly be surprising considering the record of the courts in
dealing with sexual assault.144 Why would feminists think that the
entrenchment of equality rights in the Charter would do anything to
change this? In fact, equality arguments are just one of a number
of tactics made available by the Charter to defendants charged with
sexual offenses which can be used to invalidate legislation designed
to shield women from some of the negative consequences of sexual
assault. In Seaboyer 45 a defendant charged with sexual assault
challenged the Criminal Code provisions which severely restricted the
number of situations in which a complainant could be cross-examined
about her prior sexual conduct with others than the accused on the
grounds that it violated his right to a fair trial as provided by sec-
tion 11 of the Charter. While upholding the "rape shield" provisions
in general, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated, albeit in obiter, that
there may well be exceptions wherein the court ought to exercise its
residual discretion to allow cross-examination. The result of this
decision is to place a premium upon attempts to fashion exceptions
whereby the courts are invited to exercise their discretion. The ease
with which this may be done is suggested by the Court of Appeal's
hackneyed, but predictable, reference to the complainant/prostitute
and the importance of her past sexual conduct to a just
determination of a case.1 46 In Canadian Newspapers Co. Ltd. v. A.G.
of Canada147 the appellant, a newspaper publisher, successfully
1 4 4 Boyle and Rowley, supra, note 140.
145R v Seaboyer (1987), 58 C.R.(3d) 289 (Ont.C.A.).
1 4 61bid. at 305.
147(1985), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 49 O.R. (2d) 557. Leave to appeal to Supreme Court of
Canada granted April 24, 1985, 49 O.R. (2d) 557n, 14 C.RtRt 276n. However, in R. v D.(G.)
(1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 567 the Ontario High Court accepted an application for an order quashing
the non-publication order granted by the provincial trial judge. On behalf of the High Court,
Rosenberg J. rejected the argument made by the defendant in a sexual assault case that his
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argued that the blanket prohibition against publishing, upon the
application of either the complainant or the prosecutor, the name of
complainants in sexual assault cases constituted a prima facie
violation of the Charters guarantee of freedom of expression. The
Ontario Court of Appeal stated that the trial judge should exercise
his on her discretion and balance in each case the competing
interests at stake before deciding whether or not to prohibit the
publication of the complainant's identity. The problem with this sort
of discretionary remedy is that it deprives the complainant of any
degree of certainty that her identity will be protected. Moreover,
like Seaboyer this "solution" merely enlarges the discretion of the
judiciary in an area in which the courts can hardly be said to have
exercised any sensitivity to the causes or consequences of sexual
violence against women.
Cases such as Seaboyer and Canadian Newspapers have
increasingly demanded the attention and resources of groups like
LEAF which were originally formed to use the Charter to further
feminist struggles for equality-1 8 As a result of the Charter, feminist
organizations are having to spend precious time, energy and money
in the courts defending legislation that it took many women many
years to achieve 49 Perhaps this is the ultimate paradox of the
Charter: whilst feminists organizations are attempting to develop
situated and contextual theories of equality which will address
equality rights were being infringed because, unlike the complainant, his identity was not
protected on the ground that the accused and the complainant are not similarly situated (at
574).
The Supreme Court of Canada recently overturned the Court of Appeal's decision
in Canada Newspapers (see Judgments No. 19298, Sept. 1 1988). While acknowlcdging that the
mandatory publication ban constituted aprinafacie violation of s. 2(b), the unanimous court
went on to assert that the interests protected by the ban (the complainant's willingness to cone
forward) overrode the minimal restriction imposed upon the newspaper's freedom of expression.
It is important to note, however, that the court left it open for the accused to argue that he was
being denied a fair trial on the grounds that the publication ban would preclude favourable
defense witnesses from coming forward.
148LEAF, supra, note 97 at 4,19.
1 4 9 B. James, "Breaking the Hold: Women Against Rape" in M. Fitzgerald et al., cds, Still
ain't Satisfied: Canadian Feminism Today (Toronto: Women's Press, 1982) 68 for the feminist
struggle regarding amendments to the rape legislature. See also L. Snider, "Legal Reform and
Social control: the Dangers of Abolishing Rape" (1985) 13 Int. J. Soc. L. 337 for an alternative
evaluation of the reform of the rape legislation.
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women's social and historical subordination, innumerable other
litigants, including defendants charged with sexual assault offences
and right-to-life organizations, are simultaneously invoking the
Charter to claim a formal equality which may well erode victories
which feminist believed they had already won.
II. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SEX EQUALITY
What general conclusions can be drawn from the judicial
approach to equality evinced to date? Lahey identifies an apparent
contradiction between the various equality provisions in the Charter,
which when read together appear to form a legal basis for
eliminating actual social and economic inequalities, and the judicial
interpretation of those provisions to date, which manifests an
ideology of equality which does not address systematic social
subordination. She concludes that
[o]n an empirical level, male complainants are making and winning ten times as many
equality claims as women. On the substantive level, women are loosing claims when
a loss has a major and material impact on the conditions of inequality that women
experience ... And even when women have successfully pursued equality claims on the
substance, judges have applied a purely neutral and "empty" concept of equality which
defines discrimination as any form of classification. Each and every victory for
women on 9,6 basis makes it even easier for men to win equality claims than it is
for women.
One possible reason for the astounding number of successful
challenges initiated by men is that of the few remaining uses of
explicit uses of gender-based classification in the statute books most
benefit women 51 By contrast, the majority of section 15 claims
brought by women are likely to involve claims of systematic
discrimination - claims that are notoriously difficult to establish even
when there is specific remedial legislation designed to address the
specific problem. Moreover, even in those cases where feminists
would applaud the result, the reasons offered by the courts are such
that it would be difficult to characterize the decisions as victories.
150Lahey, supra, note 7 at 82.
1 5 1 F.L. Morton and MJ. Withey, Charting The Charter, 1982-1985: A Statistical Analysis.
Occasional Paper Series, Research Study 2.1 (Calgary. Research Unit for Socio-legal Studies,
University of Calgary, 1986) at 13.
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According to Buist,
Either we are afforded the protection or benefit of the law for some archaic reason
that betrays our image and perpetuates our subordination, or we are flatly denied the
protection or benyh by a misguided definition of equality which will never redress
power imbalance.
These findings are clearly supported by the cases reviewed
above. When protective or remedial legislation directed at
addressing women's economic or sexual subordination has been
successfully defended from equality challenges by men, the courts
have upheld the "discriminatory" legislation either because it
privatizes the costs of social reproduction or it protects women from
the consequences of their own reproductive capacity. Such judicial
pronouncements both reinforce women's economic dependency upon
men and define women in terms of their biology. Consequently, in
seeking to preserve the status quo from constitutional challenges,
images of women which reinforce their social subordination are being
endorsed and perpetuated by the courts. The courts have failed to
recognize that the real justification for protective legislation for
women is not the physical condition of being female, but rather the
social and economic relations which make being female significant.
By and large the courts have adopted an extremely narrow
and formalistic approach to equality rights guaranteed under the
Charter Moreover, the weight of judicial authority states that the
purpose of section 15 is to require those who are similarly situated
be treated similarly 53 According to the British Columbia Court of
Appeal inAndrews v. Law Society of British Columbia54 a successful
claimant under section 15 must demonstrate three things:
1 5 2 M. Buist, "One Foot in The Door" (1987) 9(1) Broadside 4.
1 5 3 See M. Eberts, "Risks of Equality Litigation" in S. Martin and K. Mahoney, eds, Equalilty
and Individual Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 89 at 102-5. Addy v. Canada (1985), 22
D.L.R. (4th) 52, 19 C.IR 193 (F.C.T.D.) Re: Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association et al.,
supra, note 18; Re: Andrews and Law Society of B.C. et al. (1986) 27 D.L.R (4th) 600, 23
C.R.R1 273 (B.C.CA.) [cited to C.R.R], leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted 7 B.C.L.R. (2d) xlin;
Smitl Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. et aL v. A.G. Can (1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 584, 27
C.R.R 286 (Fed.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted 7 B.C.L.R1 (2d) xlin; R. v. Century 21
Ramos Realty Inc. and Ramos (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 737, 37 D.L.R. (4th) 649 (Ont.C.A.); M.D.
Lepofsky and H. Schwartz, "Conmnent-Ertel" (1988), 67 Can. Bar Rev. 115-28.
154(1986), 23 C.R.R at 273 (B.C.C..).
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(1) equality - that the impugned law treats them differently from other persons who
are similarly situated to them. Parties are similarly situated despite differences
between them, if those differences are irrelevant to the law's purpose;
(2) disadvantage - that in being differently treated they are subject to an inherent
disadvantage
(3) discrimination - that "a fair minded person, weighing the purposes of the
legislation against its effects on the individual adversely affected and giving due
weight to the right of the Legislature to pass laws for the good o would conclude
that the legislative means adopted are unreasonable or unfair."....
Moreover, once a finding has been made that there is a prima facie
violation of section 15, then the court is required to consider
whether that infringement can be justified under section 1. Despite
a great deal of criticism'1 6 and some judicial authority to the
contrary 5 7 this approach has generally found favour with the courts.
Andrews is significant not only for the narrow and formalistic
approach it embodies, but also because it was the first equality case
argued before the Supreme Court of Canada. LEAF successfully
sought permission to intervene at the Supreme Court since in
Andrews it is expected that the Court will outline its approach to
equality rights cases, addressing key definitional questions such as
the meaning of equality and discrimination, the relationship between
sections 15 and 1 of the Charter, and the degree of protection to
be accorded to various groups complaining of equality. In both oral
and written arguments LEAF's counsel urged the Court to "adopt a
purposive approach to the interpretation of section 15, which would
recognize both the legal process and substantive aspects to equality,
and acknowledge that the purpose of the substantive equality
guarantees is to promote the equality of hitherto powerless, excluded
and disadvantaged groups. 158 LEAF urged the Court to reject the
formal approach implicit in the "similarly-situated" test. In
considering whether a group not specifically enumerated in section
15 should be considered "akin" to those enumerated in section 15
I551bid. at 283.
156Lahey, supra, note 7.
157Smith, Kline and French Laboratories Ltd., supra, note 153. Women's Legal Education
and Action Fund (LEAF), Factum: Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1987) at 36.
1 5 8 LEAF, supra, note 157 at 37.
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protections, LEAF argued that the Court should determine on the
facts whether the case involves a denial of substantive equality to
that group of a kind section 15 is designed to address. To aid in
this inquiry LEAF suggested that the Court consider:
(a) whether and to what extent it is related to an enumerated ground (e.g., marital
status and sex, citizenship and national origin);
(b) whether it is institutionalized throughout society so as to affect, in a systematic
and cumulative way, dignity, respect, access to resources, physical security, credibility,
membership in community, or power,
(c) whether it has a social histojoof disempowerment, exploitation, and subordination
to and by dominant interests:R
With respect to women, for example, such an inquiry would require
the Court to consider "an historical context characterized by
disenfranchisement, preclusion from property ownership, exclusion
from public life, and a sex-based poverty and devaluation of women's
contributions in all spheres of social life which continue down to the
present day."160
Although it is logically possible that the courts will take a
contextualized approach to equality cases, it is highly unlikely that
they will do so on a systematic basis. While it is true that in Brown
v. Board of Education l61 the United States Supreme Court
considered the history of the educational segregation of blacks in
terms of its impact on their social and economic subordination in
the United States, in 1987 the Supreme Court refused to take
account of the overwhelming statistical evidence that the death
penalty discriminates against blacks who murders whites in the
context of a constitutional challenge to the death penalty.16 2  It is
important to remember that just because a court is prepared to take
a contextualized approach in one case does not entail either that
the same court or other courts will adopt such a contextualized
approach in succeeding cases which raise equality issues. In fact,
1 5 91bid. at 22.
160ibid. at 23.
1 6 1Browvn v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(U.S.S.C.).
1 6 2McClesAy v. Kemp 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987); Randall L Kennedy, "McClesly v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court" (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388. S. Hooker, "It's
still a question of black and white" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 May 1988) A7.
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judicial methodology, as feminists have noted,163 militates against the
systematic consideration of context. And not only does judicial
methodology itself pose real barriers to the success of such an
approach, the very way in which rights are framed in constitutional
documents such as the Canadian Charter of Rights poses another
barrier. These rights are framed in abstract and general language,
and although the equality provisions contained in the Charter are
amenable to progressive interpretations offered by feminists, 164 as the
decisions issued to date clearly demonstrate they are equally
amenable to formal and narrow interpretations which are antithetical
to feminist struggles.
This suggests that there is an inherent dilemma for feminists
struggles which resort to legal argumentation for equality rights -
the tendency towards abstraction. LEAF's intervention in Andrews
is a clear example of this. Andrews involves a constitutional
challenge by a British citizen who is a permanent resident of British
Columbia to the citizenship requirements of the Banisters and
Solicitors Act 65 on the grounds that it violates section 15. LEAF
has intervened in this case because of its significance for establishing
an authoritative approach to the question of equality rights in the
Charter. Somewhat ironically, LEAF is urging the Supreme Court
to adopt a contextualized approach to equality cases in a case in
which it has no position on the constitutional validity of the
impugned legislation. Moreover, there is no way for LEAF to avoid
intervening in cases which, although they have no direct bearing on
the question of women's social situation, may be used to establish
general approaches to the interpretation of equality issues in the
abstract. The nature of legal argumentation is such that general
and abstract language, which is also often vague and ambiguous,
must be given meaning in a range of highly particularized and
discrete contexts. And as careful analyses of judicial interpretations
163 Lahey, supra, note 7 at 83.
164See, for example, J.K. Bankier, "Equality Affirmative Action, and the Charter.
Reconciling Inconsistent Sections" (1985) 1 CJ.W.L. 134-52.
1 6 5 R.S.B.C 1979, c.26, s.42.
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of section 1 have demonstrated, although Oakes16 apparently offers
the semblance of determinacy, the courts have virtually unfettered
discretion when it comes to determining whether a prima facie
violation of the Charter is justified.167 The indeterminacy which can
be exploited in the Oakes test can also be exploited in any general
statement of what section 15 requires. Consequently, it is difficult
to see how favorable language can of itself be considered a victory,
since the judiciary is free to choose how to apply the general
language in a particular case. And perhaps most destructively, the
debate then focuses on what constitutes the most appropriate
language or interpretation, and the concrete demands and results
fade into the background.
Moreover, it is arguable that this tendency towards
abstraction which is characteristic of legal methodology is in fact
part of the very structure of liberal law under capitalism. According
to Pashukanis, the essence of law within liberal capitalism is to be
found in its distinctive form: that of the rights and duties of
individual subjects who are equal before the law.16 The juridical
constitution of free and equal individuals has both distinctive
economic advantages and serves to generate the appearance of
individual liberty and voluntaristic contractual relations, which
contributes to the occlusion of class relations and economic
constraints 69 Subjects appear free and equal before the law, yet
this formal legal equality and freedom is embedded in a social
context of overreaching inequality. In other words, the formal legal
equality before the state masks the systematic inequality in the
private sphere. And this is exactly the significance of the
1661 v. Oakes, (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
1671C. Bakan, Constitutional Argument in Canada (Harvard Law School, 1987)
[unpublished]; S.R. Peck, "An Analytical Framework for the Application of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1988) Osgoode Hall L. J. forthcoming.
168HJ. Glasbeek and M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistcs
84; R. Weitzer, "Law and Legal Ideology. Contributions to the Genesis and Reproduction of
Capitalism" (1980) 24 Berk. J. Soc. 137. S. Gavigan, "Marxist Theories of Law. A Survey of
Some Thoughts in Women and the Law" (1981) 4 Can. Crim. Forum 1.
1 6 9 Weitzer, supra, note 168 at 143.
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public/private distinction for liberal constitutional adjudication; the
Canadian Charter reifies the split and identifies the public sphere as
the source of oppression while systematically obfuscating the extent
to which the public sphere constitutes the private. To the extent
that the social relations of subordination which characterize a
particular society are both constituted by and reflected in law it is
unlikely that the law can be used to transform, instead of just
meliorating, the conditions which give rise to social subordination.
Consequently, on this reading of the limitations of legal rights within
liberalism, constitutional litigation to further substantive equality
claims should be broached with great skepticism, if at all.
As opposed to this stream of thought which tends to reject
the efficacy of legal rights in the struggle to end social inequality,
there is an alternative view, which although rejecting liberalism,
regards legal rights as "an important instrument in the defense of the
liberties of the classes and sexes."17° Sumner suggests that
[t]he modern legal right or state-conferred capacity is ... more a product of the
balance and forms of political power than of the eternal structure of commodity
exchange.... Therefore one of its most important features is that it expresses the
relative social power and political coherence of different classes, class fractions and
social groups. As such, in this limited and precise sense, modern rights (and their
erosion) can be seen as part of the milestones in the rise (and fall) of the political
power of modem social classes.... Legal rights must be seen as the gained territory
of power struggle whiA9.only becomes a barren waste if its conquerors fail to settle
upon and cultivate it.
According to Williams, rights and entitlement discourse are "the sole
proven vehicle of the European-driven legal tradition capable of
mobilizing peoples of colour as well as their allies in the majority. 172
And this view concerning the mobilizing power of struggles for legal
170I. Taylor, Law an Order: Arguments for Socialism (London, MacMillan, 1982).
171C. Sumner, 'The Rule of Law and Civil Rights in Contemporary Marxist Theory" (1981)
9 Kapitalistate 63 at 68-9.
1 7 2 RA. Williams, "Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal
Theory for Peoples of Colour" (1987) 5 Law and Inequality 103 at 121. See also IL Delgado,
'The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?" (1987) 22
Harvard Civil Rts and Civil L Rev. 301; M.M. Matsuda, "Looking To The Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations" (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rts and Civil L. Rev. 323; PJ. Williams,
"Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights" (1987) 22 Harvard Civil
Rts and Civil L. Rev. 401.
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rights is shared by many feminist writers.173 Moreover, Sumner
argues that the experience of winning and enjoying legal rights is a
necessary condition for the formation of class culture with a full
sense of socialist democracy. In light of this debate, it is crucial to
evaluate the argument that the demand for formal legal equality
itself may in fact be an important progressive demand for feminists
in certain situations. According to Eisenstein, "[a]ll feminisms
contain aspects of liberal feminism at their core - the demand for
equality, freedom of individual choice, and the recognition of woman
as an autonomous being. However feminism chooses to define these
particular demands, these are its starting points."1 74 And while
Eisenstein admits that history demonstrates that formal legal equality
is not sufficient for substantive social equality, she suggests that it
may very well be a necessary condition for obtaining it. If this
analysis is correct, it suggests that there might be a positive role in
Charter litigation for furthering feminists struggles in Canada. For
although it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, for a court to
systematically adopt a contextualized approach to equality claims
within a liberal-capitalist political economy, courts are particularly
amenable to arguments for the extension of formal equality.
A. The Legal Regulation of Reproduction - Abortion
Nowhere has the argument for the significance of legal rights
and formal equality as the first step in the feminist struggle for
substantive equality been made more persuasively than with respect
to the issue of reproductive freedom for women. The demand for
access to safe, legal and funded abortion has been a cornerstone of
the struggle for full sexual and reproductive freedom, which is, in
turn, "an essential precondition to full and equal participation in
173 L. Gotell, "A Helluva lot to lose...but Not a Helluva lot to win: The Canadian Womcn's
Movement, Equality Rights and the Charter" (Annual Meeting of the Atlantic Political Science
Association, University of New Brunswick, Fredrickton, October 31, 1987) [unpublished].
References at supra, note 50.
174 ZR. Eisenstein, Feminism and Sexual Equality: Crisis in Liberal America (New York:
Monthly Review, 1984) at 12.
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society."' 75 According to Petchesky two essential ideas underlie a
feminist view of reproductive freedom:
The first is derived from the biological connection between women's bodies, sexuality
and reproduction. It is an extension of the general principle of "bodily integrity," or
"bodily self-determination," to the notion that women must be able to control their
bodies and procreative capacities. The second is a "historical and moral argument"
based on the social position of women and the needs that such a position generates.
It states that insofar as women, under the existing division of labour between the
sexes, are the ones most affected by pregnancy, since they are the ones responsible
for the care and rearing of children, 4t is women who must decide about
contraception, abortion and childbearing.
1 6
And as Gavigan has noted, concepts such as freedom, equality,
autonomy and privacy, which are central to liberal law, may in fact
be used to legitimize women's right to demand control of their
bodies and to reject state interference.77 This is particularly true
in countries such as Canada where the criminal law has been used
to control or regulate women's reproductive capacity. Until January
28, 1988 when the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its
decision in Morgentaler'78, the availability of legal abortions was
governed by the Criminal Code, and determined in practice by
hospital administrators and doctors.1 79 Moreover, the "criminal
prohibition of abortion, save for therapeutic reasons, has been
interpreted to endow neither the woman nor the fetus with formal
rights. The only 'right' apparently extended by the law is a 'right' of
medical practitioners not to be prosecuted in the criminal courts if
they comply with the legislation."'180 By employing the criminal law,
the most profound expression of the state's coercive powers, the
1 7 5 SA.M. Gavigan, "Women and Abortion in Canada: What's Law Got To Do With It?"
in HJ. Maroney and M. Luxton, ed., Feninism and Political Economy: Women in Canada
(Toronto: Methuen, 1987) 263 at 271.
176IPp. Petchesky, Abortion & Women's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive
Freedom (New York: Longman Inc., 1984) at 2.
177S. Gavigan, supra, note 175 at 275. But see also MacKinnon, supra, note 16, 93-102 for
a contrary view.
17S1 v. Morgantaler (1988), [1988] 1 S.C.IR 30, 82 N.Rt 1 (S.C.C.).
179 Crininal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, s.251.
180 Gavigan, supra, note 132 at 107.
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federal government clearly established that a women's decision
concerning whether or not to continue her pregnancy could not be
trusted to her, but rather was a matter of public concern. Thus, the
demand for the decriminalization of abortion has, paradoxically, been
a demand to turn what has traditionally been considered a public
issue, a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy, into a matter of
private choice.
Ultimately feminist organizations turned to the courts to
challenge the Criminal Code provisions which limited and regulated
women's access to safe legal abortions. Successive federal
governments have manifested an extreme unwillingness to tamper
with the legislation in light of the polarization of right-to-life groups
and the pro-choice movement. Even the finding of its own
Committee on the Operation of the Abortion Laws that in practice
the legislation was arbitrary and unfair did not move the
government 181
And perhaps most strikingly, the government ignored
repeated evidence that juries were unwilling to convict Dr. Henry
Morgentaler for violating section 251 of the Criminal Code. On
three previous occasions juries had acquitted Morgentaler of the
charge of illegally "procuring a miscarriage" without the prior
approval of a therapeutic abortion committee of an approved or
accredited hospital. On each occasion the acquittal was overturned
by the Quebec Court of Appeal.18 2 Although he was once again
acquitted by the jury, during the last prosecution Morgentaler
challenged section 251 on the ground that it violated the Chater8 3
1 8 1See Canada, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Abortion Law (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1977) (Badgely Report).
182For a brief discussion of the previous charges laid against Dr. Morgantaler and their
eventual outcome see S. Martin, "R. v. Morgentaler and Sinolling" (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 194
at 195-6.
183Two other doctors, Drs. Smolling and Scott were also charged with Dr. Morgentaler for
violating s.251 of the Criminal Code.
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Morgentaler's acquittal was reversed by the Ontario Court of
Appeal. Counsel for the defense 84 sought to persuade the Court
that the legislation not only violated the principle of fundamental
justice guaranteed by section 7, it also violated section 15. The
latter argument was summarily rejected on the grounds that "[a]ny
inequality of the sexes in this area is not created by legislation but
by nature. 185 Moreover, the Court did not accept the section 7
argument, and, thus, overturned the acquittal. However, in a
landmark decision which has been celebrated as a great victory in
the feminist struggle for women's reproductive freedom the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down the Criminal Code provision regulating
abortion on the grounds that it violated the Charter.
But once the initial heady days immediately preceding the
decision had past, feminists began to look much more carefully at
the actual basis of the decision in order to prepare for the struggle
which lay ahead.1 86 Although undeniably a victory in that the
extremely coercive and arbitrary Criminal Code provision was no
longer in effect, a reading of the actual decision demonstrates how
narrow the victory actually is.
The first thing to note about the decision is the fact that it
generated so many different responses from the members of the
Supreme Court, a group not noted for their profound ideological
differences. While five judges agreed that section 251 of the
Criminal Code violated the Charter's guarantee of fundamental
justice, two dissented1 87 But even among the judges who agreed
184Interestingly, Morris Manning, who was Dr. Morgentaler's defense lawyer, was also
hired by a group called "Freedom of choice" to challenge what Manning called "compulsory
unionism between an individual employee and management, which occurs when a union is
certified to represent all employees" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 July 1985) Al, A6.
18 5R v. Morgentaler et aL (1985) 52 O.R. (2d) 353, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (Ont.CA) at
395 quoting Ritchie J. in Bliss, supra, note 68.
18 6Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, (1988) 5 LEAF LE7TER at 4.
187Supra, note, 178 at 148.
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that the legislation ought to be struck down as a violation of section
7 there was a wide divergence of opinion.1 88
At the most restrictive end of the spectrum Beetz , with
Estey concurring, adopted a narrow, procedural approach to
fundamental justice guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter. While
affirming the state's right to enact legislation restricting access to
abortion on the grounds that the state had a legitimate interest in
the foetus, Beetz went on to assert that section 251 violated section
7 because in actual operation the procedural mechanisms significantly
delayed pregnant women's access to medical treatment, increasing
the danger to their health and thereby depriving them of security of
the person. But Beetz was careful to emphasize that requiring a
woman to demonstrate to a committee of medical personnel that
continuing her pregnancy would endanger her health would not
offend the principles of fundamental justice, and that Parliament was
not precluded from adopting another system, free of the failings of
section 251, to regulate access to abortions. In fact, he asserted that
it was Parliament's responsibility to balance the public interest in
protecting the foetus against a women's health.
Dickson, with Lamer concurring, also adopted a narrow
procedural view to section 7; however, he adopted a broader view
than Beetz about what the phrase "security of the person"
encompassed. He asserted that interference with a woman's
priorities and aspirations constituted an infringement of her security
of the person 89 Thus, he was prepared to go a bit further than
Beetz in allowing a woman's private choice to trump the state's
interest in the protection of the foetus.
Wilson, alone of the seven judges participating in the
decision, offered a substantive interpretation of section 7. She
concluded "that the right to liberty contained in section 7 guarantees
to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important
decisions intimately affecting their private lives."190 Moreover, she
188The members of the Supreme Court of Canada were unanimous in rejecting the s.15
argument raised by Morgentaler.
189Supra, note, 178 at 74.
190Supra, note, 178 at 71.
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stated that the decision of whether or not to terminate a pregnancy
was not "just a medical decision" but a "profound social and ethical
one as well," and doubted the ability of "a man to respond, even
imaginatively, to such a dilemma not just because it is outside the
realm of his personal experience (although this is, of course, the
case) but because he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby
eliminating the subjective elements of the female psyche which are
at the heart of the dilemma."1 91 But while Wilson's analysis of
section 7 echoed the rhetoric of feminist appeals for reproductive
freedom as an element of personal autonomy, she concluded by
asserting that the right of a pregnant woman under section 7 must
be balanced against the state's interest in the protection of the
foetus as potential life under section 1 of the Charter. And although
Wilson refused to articulate a full-fledged scheme for balancing the
competing interests,192 she suggested that a developmental approach
to the foetus be adopted, thereby harnessing a woman's autonomy
to foetal viability and medical technology.
Amongst the confusing plurality of opinions offered by the
Supreme Court regarding the unconstitutionality of the Criminal
Code provisions regulating a woman's access to abortion two
common themes clearly emerge. First, there was unanimity that the
state has an interest in the protection of the foetus. Although there
was no convergence of opinion as to when the state's interest ought
to surpass a woman's right to security of the person, all of the
judges who held that the legislation violated the Charter were agreed
that the public interest ought, in certain unidentified circumstances,
to supersede a woman's private right. Second, none of the members
of the Court addressed the issue of whether or not the government
was under an obligation to provide access to safe legal abortions, all
they did was declare that the present criminal law regime violated
the Charter.
Thus, by striking down the existing legislation, the Supreme
Court disclosed the limitations inherent in Charter litigation as an
191Ibid
1 9 2 By contrast, the United States Supreme Court articulated detailed rules regarding
access to lawful abortions. See Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 142 (1973).
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instrument for furthering feminist struggles. A legal vacuum
replaced the criminal provisions. In the absence of federal
legislation, access to safe funded abortions depended either upon the
response of individual provincial legislatures or individual hospitals.193
Provincial responses ranged from an attempt to prohibit public
funding of abortions except for those cases involving a serious threat
to a woman's physical health or life,/ 94 to a commitment to fund
even those abortions performed in free-standing clinics.195
193Prince Edward Island is an example of the latter. See "PEI will foot bill if abortion
approved" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 February 1988) A2; R. Martin, "Decision leaves
PEI Women Without Access" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 February 1988) A3.
Z94See B.C. Reg 221/88. Note that the British Columbia Supreme Court subsequently
invalidated this Regulation on the ground that the cabinet had exceeded its authority under
the Medical Services Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.255. See B.C. Civil Liberties Association v.A.G. of
British Columbia, [unreported].
-
195 Ontario responded with the most expansive coverage. See D. McMonagle and D.
Wilson, "OHIP to cover all abortions, Caplan says" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 February
1988) Al. On June 2nd, 1988, Ontario's Minister of Health introduced legislation to licence,
regulate and finance independent clinics. See Bill 147 Independent Health Facilities Act, 1st
Sess., 34th Leg.Ont., 1988. (First reading, 2 June 1988).
Alberta: Women need approval of two doctors, financing of hospital abortions only,
G. York, "Bill perceived as tool in fight" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19
February 1988) A3.
Saskatchewan: Funding for 'life threatening or medically necessary," hospital
abortions only, requirement of two doctors approval, G. York, "Saskatchewan limits
abortion financing" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (18 February 1988) Al; Canadian
Abortion Rights Action League (CARAL)" The Provincial Situation In Response
to the Supreme Court Decision' (May 1988 Mimeo). Saskatchewan has also
proposed legislation protecting hospital staff from disciplinary action should they
refuse to participate in abortion procedures, G. York, "Bill perceived as tool in
fight" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 February 1988) A3.
Manitoba: Funding for hospital abortions only as clinics deemed "unsafe and
biased" women must be counselled with range of "alternatives," G. York, "Manitoba
won't pay for clinic abortions" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (3 June 1988) A5.
The Manitoba College of Physicians and Surgeons has approved Dr. Henry
Morgentaler's Winnipeg clinic-but only for abortions "up to 14 weeks of gestation".
"Abortion clinic in Winnipeg wins approval" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (3
March 1988) A21.
New Brunswick. Funding for hospital abortions only with two doctors approval,
"New Brunswick will resist attempts to establish clinic" The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (18 February 1988) A8.
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Moreover, it should be noted that the most "liberal" scheme of
access to safe funded abortions was introduced in the province of
Quebec in 1976 after the first round of convictions against
Morgentaler - twelve years before the "historic" decision was handed
down. And until the federal government finds the political will to
enact legislation regulating access to safe, funded and legal abortions
the arbitrary state of affairs which existed under administration of
the Criminal Code provisions will be exacerbated by the differential
provincial responses.196 Thus, while the Supreme Court's decision
served to decriminalize abortion, a central demand in the feminist
campaign for reproductive freedom, it failed either to provide much
guidance as to what a constitutional scheme of regulation ought to
consist of or to impose a positive duty upon the state to provide
access to safe funded abortions.19
7
NOTE: The province of Quebec has funded abortions performed in private clinics
since the Morgentaler cases of the 1970's and the coming to power of the Parti
Quebecois.
1 9 6 0n May 20, 1988, Justice Minister Hnatyshyn introduced a tripartite motion into the
House of Commons which would, in effect, call for a free vote on three proposals restricting
the availability of abortions. The main part of the motion would allow a woman, in
consultation with her doctor, to terminate a pregnancy in the early stages. At later stages the
pregnancy could only be terminated where, in the opinion of two doctors, the continuation of
the pregnancy would seriously endanger the woman's life or health. The first amendment would
seriously restrict access to abortion, requiring the opinion of two doctors that the continuation
of a woman's pregnancy would endanger her health and safety, defined so as to exclude
emotional stress and social and economic conditions. (Hnatyshyn noted that this option might
require the government to override the charter, "Restricting Abortion may flunk court test," The
[Toronto] Globe andMail (1 June 1988) Al.) The second amendment would expand a woman's
access to abortion, giving her virtually unrestricted access: Canada, House of Commons, Order
Paper and Notices, 2nd Sess., 33 Parl. at 37-9 (24 May 1988). Owing to procedural wranglings
the vote on the motion was delayed and eventually withdrawn: "Tories plan to suspend
Parliamentary rules for debate on abortion." The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 May 1988) Al;
"New plan on abortion vote going to Tory MP's tomorrow" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19
July 1988). On July 22 the government introduced a new motion which was substantially the
same as the first motion regarding abortion without the two amendments attached and is
allowing amendments from the floor of the House and a free vote. S. Delacourt, "Government
will take new abortion proposal; debate begins Tuesday" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (22 July
1988) Al; S. Delacourt, "New abortion restriction draws criticism" The [Toronto] Globe andMail
(23 July 1988) Al, A2. On 28 July 1988 the House of Commons held a free vote on the
motion. The government asserts that the motion will be the basis of new legislation regulating
abortion.
1 9 7According to Estey, in a statement quoted shortly after he announced his retirement
from the Supreme Court and just several months after the Court's decision in Morgentaler was
handed down, the effect of the decision was to throw the issue of abortion back to Parliament.
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 April 1988) Al, A5.
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But clearly the most disturbing aspect of the Morgentaler
decision for feminists is the implicit characterization of the debate
around abortion as consisting of a conflict between the public
interest in the protection of the foetus and the private right of a
woman to personal autonomy. Moigentaler has not ended the debate
over the criminalization of abortion, the issue of foetal rights or the
question of state funding.198  In fact, only four months after
Morgentaler was handed down an amendment to the Criminal Code
was introduced in the Senate to make it an indictable offence
punishable for two years imprisonment for a pregnant female person
to use any means to carry out the intent "to cause the death of an
unborn human being within her".199 Moreover, the Supreme Court
is going ahead with the appeal of the Borowski decision, which
involved a challenge to the Criminal Code provisions struck down in
Morgentaler, on the ground that access to legal abortions infringed
the right of a foetus to life, liberty and security of the person as
guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter.2°  In fact, the Supreme
Court studiously avoided ruling upon this issue in Mogentaler20 1
Although there appears to be but a tenuous legal basis for
continuing with the appeal since the impugned provision has already
been struck down, the Supreme Court of Canada has granted
Borowski leave to resubmit his factum. Moreover, both LEAF,
198See Petchesky, supra, note 176 at 286. If the experience in the United States of a
concerted attack on abortion after their Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, supra, note
192, is any indication, Morgentaler is just the beginning of a wave of litigation and mobilization
by the contending sides of the abortion debate.
199Bill S-16, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (protection of the unborn), 2nd Sess., 33rd
Pal., 1988. (First reading 18 May 1988). For others the penalty is life imprisonment.
200Borowski v. A.-G.Can. (1987), 29 C.R.R 244, [1987] 4 W.W.R. 385 (Sask.CA.). Leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court granted July 29, 1987, Doc. No. 20411, S.C.C. However, the
federal government has sought a postponement on the Borowski case until after Parliament has
dealt with the abortion issue, "Delay request on abortion ruling irks Tory MP's," The fTorontoJ
Globe andMail (15 July 1988) A9. The Supreme Court refused to defer the appeal: G. Frazer,
'Top Court refuses to delay hearing on rights of fetus" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20 July
1988) Al.
201Stpra, note, 178 at 74 and 128.
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representing the pro-choice feminist stance, and REAL Women, a
pro-family, anti-abortion group,202 have been granted leave to
intervene. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has provided the
venue for Borowski to debate the constitutional protection of the
foetus's right to life with an unwilling government whilst LEAF and
REAL Women act as handmaidens to the Court.
To date, Borowski's attempt to establish the status of the
foetus as a legal person with a set of rights guaranteed under the
Charter has not been successful, basically on the grounds that the
common law has never granted the foetus such status.203 However,
there is a clear and unsettling trend toward recognizing legal rights
of the foetus in both American and Canadian case law and in the
recent work of legal and medical scholars.2 4 What this suggests is
that it is not necessary for the foetus to receive full recognition
under the Charter, so long as the state is prepared to use the
plethora of child welfare legislation at is disposal to exercise the
public interest in the protection of the foetus. This tactic is
increasingly being employed in Canada,205 whilst in the United States
it is supplemented with a sophisticated and concerted attempt to
reverse Roe v.Wade in the courts.206 Americans have learnt that
judicial decisions are no less subject to reversal than are legislative
policies,207 and that a change in the political climate which might
2 0 2 Gavigan, supra, note 180 at 109.
203Supra, note 200.
204S. Rogers, "Fetal Rights and Maternal Rights: Is there a Conflict?" (1986) 1 CJ.W.L.
456.
205 See Re: Children's Aid Society for the District of Kenora and J.L. (1981), 134 D.L.R
(3d) 249; Re:Superintendent of Family and Child Services and McDonald (1982) 135 D.L.RI (3d)
330; Re: Sinns and H. (1979), 106 D.L.R. (3d) 435, 38 N.S.R. (2d) 432 (N.S.Fam.Ct.).
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, "Apprehending a Fetus" (1988) 5 LEAF LETTER
at 5.
2 0 6 DJ. Horan, E.R. Grant, P.C. Cunningham, ed.,Abortion and the Constitution: Reversing
Roe v. Wade Through The Courts (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1987).
207In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, No. 87-107, a case pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the court decided to reconsider the rights of minorities to sue private parties
for racial discrimination under a post-civil War Statute. See Runyon v. McCeary, 96 S Ct. 2586
(1976).
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occasion an alteration in the political composition of the courts can
result in the reversal of historic decisions. Thus, it is important to
recognize that the courts and litigation strategies are no less arenas
of political debate and instruments of political mobilization than
legislatures and traditional lobbying. No matter how distinctive the
courts' institutional form or rhetoric of decision-making, judicial
institutions make political decisions - decisions which are directly
related to the distribution of power and the maintenance of, or
encroachment upon, existing social relations.
Consequently, the appropriate question when considering the
impact of the Charter is which of the variety of existing available
strategies is the best way to further the feminist struggle for
reproductive freedom. To lobby for legislative changes, no less than
Charter litigation, is to directly engage with the law, and both
avenues may constitute forms of political mobilization.208 What it is
important to keep in mind, however, is that although both the courts
and the legislatures form part of the state, they have different
institutional dynamics, roles and principles of legitimation. And
these factors must be considered when it comes to evaluating any
particular tactic as part of the overall strategy for obtaining
reproductive freedom for women.
This problem of how best to obtain reproductive freedom for
women has prompted a variety of diverse and contradictory
responses from feminist writers. Kingdom has posed the question in
its most general form: she asks whether feminist objectives are
helped or hindered if feminists demands are expressed in terms of
legal rights.209 Specifically, she is concerned that by phrasing the
demand for access to safe funded legal abortions in terms of an
absolute right to choose, feminists are themselves in danger of
initiating the elision from decriminalization to deregulation. In a
similar vein, Fox-Genovese is concerned that the present feminist
demand for abortion is both premised upon radical individualism
and rests upon the assumption that the decision of whether or not
208For an analysis of litigation as political action see K. O'Connor, Women's Organizations
use of the Coutrs (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1980) Chapter 1.
2 09 L. Kingdom, "Legal Recognition of a Woman's Right to Choose" in J. Brophy and C.
Smart, eds, Wonen in Law (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1985) at 143.
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to continue pregnancy is a matter of private choice.210  Both
Kingdom and Fox-Genovese share the concern that by framing
abortion in terms of a private right to autonomy feminists are
implicitly reinforcing the public/private split which has historically
worked to women's disadvantage. This point is made with great
force by MacKinnon who asserts that "[t]he political and ideological
meaning of privacy as a legal doctrine is connected with the concrete
consequences of the public/private split for the lives of women."211
MacKinnon worries that the law of privacy translates traditional
social values (male sexual aggression and female sexual availability,
in particular) into the rhetoric of individual rights as a means of
subordinating these rights to specific social imperatives (such as
female sexual subordination).212
Addressing some of these kinds of concerns, Petchesky has
been careful to emphasize that to "demand that the state provide
uniform, funded, and high-quality abortion services to all women has
been to acknowledge that abortion should be a matter of public
responsibility and not of 'private choice' alone."213 Thus, she has
sought to emphasize that the feminist demand for reproductive
freedom is not merely a negative demand for the state to abstain
from intervening in the private sphere, but rather includes a positive
demand that the state create the conditions whereby women may
exercise autonomy and choice either by deciding to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy in a safe and legal manner or by having the
resources to raise children. And while it is true that the courts in
a liberal political economy are ill-suited for bestowing such positive
rights, it is appropriate to turn to the legislature to fulfill these types
of demands. Thus, it is important to recognize that Charter litigation
210E. Fox-Genovese, "Women's Rights Affirmative Action, and the Myth of Individualism"
(1986) 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 338 at 372-4.
2 1 1 Mac~innon, supra, note 16 at 93.
2 121bid. at 95, 97.
2 13 Petchesky, supra, note 176 at 384. For the original version of the debate between
Petchesky and MacKinnon over abortion see MacKinnon, "The Male Ideology of Privacy: A
Feminist Perspective on the Right to Abortion" (July-Aug. 1983) 17(4) Radical America;
Petchesky, "Abortion as 'Violence Against Women': a Feminist Critique" (1984) 18(2-3)
Radical America 64-68; Reply by MacKinnon (1984) 18(2-3) Radical America 69-70.
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and legislative lobbying, as well as political mobilization, may not be
mutually exclusive in all cases, but rather reinforcing. Legal notions
of formal equality, privacy and autonomy may very well be a
necessary first step to achieve substantive reproductive freedom for
women both within and without socialism.2 14 Moreover, it is exactly
these types of arguments that courts are particularly susceptible to,
and it is here that Charter litigation might have a valuable role to
play. By calling upon the Supreme Court to recognize the force of
the claims of bourgeois (liberal) legality in Morgentaler, feminists
created the occasion whereby the issue of access to safe, legal and
funded abortions moved to the centre of public and political debate.
Thus, it is crucial to understand that Charter litigation,
although at times a necessary arena of struggle, is not in itself
sufficient (even when successful) to achieve substantive equality.
However, it is equally important to understand that liberal rights
and freedoms are contradictory and insufficient rather than illusory,
and the struggle for social transformation may often involve pushing
bourgeois forms of legality to their limit.215  Feminists must be
vigilant against allowing litigation to dominate the political and social
struggle to obtain substantive equality for women, because the
tendency of litigation strategies is to transform politics into a series
of narrow issues packaged as private and individual cases.2 1 6  As
Tushnet has noted in the context of the NAACP's struggle for
educational desegregation, it is important to distinguish between
litigation as a tactic which is part of an overall political strategy for
social justice, and litigation as the strategy for attaining social
justice.217 Litigation must always be seen as part of a larger political
struggle, and, therefore, must be evaluated in terms of what it
contributes to the attainment of larger political goals. Charter
litigation is a form of politics, but it is a peculiarly abstract and
214Gavigan, supra, note 175 at 274.
2 1 5 Gavi.an, supra, note 214; B. Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law (London: Pluto
Press, 1984) at 5.
216Cowan, supra, note 43 at 402.
2 1 7 M.V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987) at 164.
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undemocratic form.2 18  Thus, it is crucial to consider the
consequences of entering into an arena unsuited for concrete
arguments about social conditions and organized around principles
of universality and abstraction. Moreover, the consequences of both
victory and defeat, the limited repertoire of judicial remedies, and
the dangers of employing abstract rhetoric must be considered each
time litigation is initiated. And finally, it must also be remembered
that feminists, like other social activists, do not always have the
luxury of the choice of whether or not to litigate, but must often
respond to litigation, like Borowskd, which was initiated to undermine
some of the all-too-few and tenuous victories feminists have already
won.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The public/private split is central to law within a liberal
capitalist political economy, to feminist theory, and to political
rhetoric. But how and where the distinction is drawn depends upon
the theoretical perspective employed, the function it is designed to
serve and the contradictions which emerge when a seemingly
straightforward conceptual apparatus is employed to make sense of
complicated and interrelated social phenomena. Moreover, within
a given area, the public/private distinction is contested, shifting both
over time and in relation to the specific issues under consideration.
Thus, it is impossible to map the distinction by placing a snapshot of
its contours in one area like a grid upon its contours in another
area. "Public" and "private" are not analytic, a priori concepts, but
rather socially constituted concepts whose significance is functional,
rather than analytic. But while it is important to unearth the
genealogy of the distinction in a particular context,21 9 its ideological
significance must be systematically linked to a material basis if
feminists, and other social activists, are to either exploit it or
overcome it in the struggle for social transformation.
What is the possibility that Charter litigation will further the
2 1 8 Mandel and Glasbeek, supra, note 168.
2 1 9 Rose, supra, note 13.
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struggle for substantive equality for women? Any adequate answer
to this question requires that we stop thinking of the law as a unity
specifically organized for oppressing women, and recognize that "law"
is comprised of specific, but indeterminate, social relations between
various institutional actors and social agents. Here Smart's notion
of "the uneven development of the law" is helpful, for it
perceives law as operating on a number of dimensions at the same time. Law is not
identified as a simple tool of patriarchy or capitalism. To analyze law in this way
creates the possibility of seeing law both as a means of "liberation" and, at the same
time, as a means of the reprocftion of the social order. Law both facilitates change
and is an obstacle to change.
Thus, it is crucial to be very concrete when it comes to evaluating
a particular tactic in the overall strategy for ending women's
oppression. Each common law rule, piece of legislation, or action
of an administrative body must be examined with respect to its
historical significance and role in either constituting, maintaining or
ameliorating the social relations which constitute women's
subordination at a given time. And while it is true that the past
does not determine the future, it sets limits on what is possible.
This recognition of the significance of history is what distinguishes
a materialist from a liberal analysis of the possibilities of litigation.
For a materialist, asking what is logically possible for the courts to
do is pointless, instead the important question is what they are likely
to do in light of the historical record and the balance of power at
a particular time and in a particular context. In order to evaluate
the impact of Charter litigation it is important to locate the courts
in the structure of social relations. Moreover, it is equally
important to see that the social relations which constitute women's
oppression are themselves never static, but are in a constant process
of redefinition, retrenchment, challenge, and struggle.
This essay is a preliminary attempt at showing how a crucial
distinction for law within a liberal capitalist political economy
operates within a number of areas which are central to women's
position in society. The claim is not that the law or the
public/private distinction is primary to or uniquely constitutive of
220 C. Smart, "Feminism and Law- Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy" (1986) 14
Int. J. Soc. L. 109 at 117.
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women's oppression, but rather that both contribute to the creation
and maintenance of women's subordination under existing social
relations. To date, the public/private distinction has operated
primarily as a barrier to using constitutionally entrenched rights to
end women's oppression as it is shaped by work, the family and
sexual violence. The public/private distinction has operated in a
variety of ways to exclude judicial scrutiny of the private sphere of
the market, to reinforce the naturalistic ideology of familism and to
emphasize women's biological vulnerability while ignoring men's
socio-sexual aggression. The abstract and universal form of legal
rights within liberalism has not proven to be amenable to the
concrete, contextualized analysis which is a necessary first step for
ameliorating women's systemic social subordination. Feminist
demands can be accommodated within the formal notions of equality
or the negative concept of autonomy both of which are part and
parcel of liberal rights, but by celebrating the Charter feminists risk
legitimating abstract rights which have been used to attack legislation
which redistributes power, however marginally, from the powerful to
the disadvantaged.2 21 The problem with endorsing Charter litigation
as a terrain of progressive struggle is that it requires the concrete to
be translated into the abstract, while simultaneously transferring
power away from institutions which are in principle democratic to
institutions which are by definition authoritarian.
Charter litigation is a particular form of political struggle. As
Miliband has noted, legal rules and rights are particularly elastic
notions for the courts are vested with a great deal of discretion. But
how the courts will exercise their discretion depends upon the
political climate.222 As the twenty-first century draws closer, the
New Right, or the Neo-Conservatives, continue to consolidate their
hold over the political agenda.223 Moreover, Petchesky identifies the
2 21 See Glasbeek and Mandel, supra, note 168; Petter, supra, note 126; Fudge, supra,
note 25.
2 22 R Miliband, "Altruism and Capitalist Democracy" in C. Harlow, ed., Public Law and
Politics (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986) at 33.
223For a discussion of the growth of the New Right see S. Hall and M. Jacques, ed., The
Politics of Thatcherism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983); C. Leys, "Neo-Conservatism and
the Organic Crisis in Britain" (1980) 4 Studies in Political Economy 41-63; 7. Eisenstein,
Feminism and the State: Reagan, Neoconservatism and Revisionist Feminism (N.Y.: Monthly
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ideology of privatism as the element in the antiabortion/antifeminist
thrust that has provided the critical link between family and sexual
politics and traditional economic and social conservatism which
characterizes the New Right.224
The ideology of privatism is employed in the New Rights's
moral offensive in two interlocking themes. The first can be seen
in the antifeminist backlash, which involves making areas which are
currently considered private (sexual preference and reproductive
freedom) public. And the second is the anti-welfare backlash, which
involves making the public, state-funded economic and social
programs, private by subjecting them once again to unregulated
market forces. But, as Petchsky observes, it is important to
distinguish the New Right's appeal to privatism from that of classical
liberalism, for the demands of privacy by the New Right are made
on behalf of corporate bodies (churches, private schools,
corporations, families, for example) rather than individuals.22- Thus,
Petchseky fears that the New Right's appeal to privatism is closer to
fascism than liberalism.
It is precisely this fear that has led several Canadian 226 and
some British227 commentators to extol the virtues of an entrenched
bill of rights as a prophalytic against the erosion of personal liberties.
According to them a constitutionally entrenched guarantee of
individual rights will serve to protect the citizenry from the coercive
paternalism of an over zealous state. However, the record of
Canadian courts lends but limited support for the claim that the
courts will provide institutionalized resistance to massive
Review, 1984); W. Magnusson et al., ed., The New Reality: The Politics of Restraint in British
Columbia (Vancouver Newstar, 1984); Warren Magnusson et al., ed., After Bennett: A New
Politics for British Columbia (Vancouver. Newstar, 1986).
2 2 4 Petchesky, supra, note 176 at 233.
2251bid. at 249.
226C. Campbell, 'The Canadian Left and the Charter of Rights" (1984) 2 Socialist
Studies/Etudes Socialists 30; D. Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work (Kingston and Montreal:
McGill - Queen's U.P., 1987).
2 2 7 M. Zander, A Bill of Rights? 3d ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985); L. Searman,
English Law - The New Dimension (London: Stevens, 1974) at 18-21.
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encroachments on personal liberties by a democratically elected
government.228 The rebuttal to this is, of course, that prior to 1981
Canadian courts were not armed with an entrenched Charter of
Rights.229 But if the American record during civil rights debacles
similar to what occurred in Canada is considered, one can only
conclude that the American courts failed systematically to defend
individual rights in the face of a government committed to eroding
them.230
Moreover, recent Canadian Charter jurisprudence suggests
that Charter-wielding courts will not prove to be the final bastion
of individual rights against the encroachments of corporate actors.
In Blainey the Ontario Court of Appeal asserted that the Charter
was not meant to apply to private organizations, 231 while in Dolphin
Delivejy the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the Charter did
not apply to the common law between private parties.232 By insu-
lating private institutions, such as corporations, or churches or
schools, from the state, the Charter may facilitate the coercion of
individuals in the name of privacy and freedom.233 Moreover, the
Charter may be actively used by these private institutions to enhance
their autonomy by challenging regulatory legislation which may be
2 28 T. Berger, Fragile Freedoms (Toronto: Clark Irwin, 1981) for a discussion of the courts'
failure to protect court liberties in Canada.
2 29Beatty, supra, note 226 at 49.
2 3 0Note the failure of the American Bill of Rights to protect Japanese Americans who were
interned during the Second World War. See Korematsu v U.S. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) and also
Hirabayashi v US. 320 U.S. 81 (1943), currently under petition. Note that the dissenting judge
in the 1944 Korematsu decision called the majority's conclusion a "legalization of racism", at 241-
2. In 1984, a federal judge "vacated" Korematsu's 1944 conviction on grounds of government
misconduct (misleading Court on so-called danger, etc.) and granted coram nobis petition.
Korematsu v U.S. 584 F. supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
See also the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of legislation designed to repress
Communist activities in M.R Belknap, Cold War PoliticalJustice (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1977).
2 3
'Blainey, supra, note 18.
232Dolphih Delivery, supra, note 19.
2 3 3 Fox-Genovese, supra, note 210 at 347-350, recognizes that there has long been
corporatist elements within American liberalism.
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designed to redistribute the "natural" allotments of. the market.234
Thus, although the Charter might have a limited capacity to
further feminist struggles, it also has a capacity to undermine them.
While the struggle for social transformation must be carried on in a
number of arenas simultaneously, feminists must be careful to select
those arenas which are least likely to contain and limit their goals,
and most likely to challenge existing social relations. And if the
preceding analysis of the impact of the Charter on feminist struggles
has any merit, feminists ought to approach the arena of Charter
litigation with great trepidation, if at all.
234For a discussion of how the Charter can be used to further corporate rights and erode
social welfare legislation, see A. Petter, 'The Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.
973.
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